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A B S T R A C T
This thesis collects the outcomes of a Ph.D. course in Telecommuni-
cations Engineering and it is focused on the study and design of pos-
sible techniques able to counteract interference signal in Global Nav-
igation Satellite System (GNSS) systems. The subject is the jamming
threat in navigation systems, that has become a very increasingly im-
portant topic in recent years, due to the wide diffusion of GNSS-based
civil applications. Detection and mitigation techniques are developed
in order to fight out jamming signals, tested in different scenarios and
including sophisticated signals. The thesis is organized in two main
parts, which deal with management of GNSS intentional counterfeit
signals.
The first part deals with the interference management, focusing on
the intentional interfering signal. In particular, a technique for the
detection and localization of the interfering signal level in the GNSS
bands in frequency domain has been proposed. In addition, an effec-
tive mitigation technique which exploits the periodic characteristics
of the common jamming signals reducing interfering effects at the
receiver side has been introduced. Moreover, this technique has been
also tested in a different and more complicated scenario resulting still
effective in mitigation and cancellation the interfering signal, without
high complexity.
The second part still deals with the problem of interference man-
agement, but regarding with more sophisticated signal. The attention
is focused on the detection of spoofing signal, which is the most com-
plex among the jamming signal types. Due to this highly difficulty in
detect and mitigate this kind of signal, spoofing threat is considered
the most dangerous. In this work, a possible techniques able to detect
this sophisticated signal has been proposed, observing and exploiting
jointly the outputs of several operational block measurements of the
GNSS receiver operating chain.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Nowadays, the major part of the people worldwide relies on satellite
navigation systems to provide Position-Velocity-Time (PVT) solutions
to a number of critical and commercial applications, with a strong
impact on most aspects of the daily human life and for the society
too. All common devices used everyday, as smartphones and vehicles,
have a GNSS receiver, thus several applications rely on the accuracy
of the delivered PVT solutions. In addition, the civilian applications
that range from emergency to route instructions, including also all
the types of transportation systems, from air through marine to land,
and police and rescue services and many more, are based on the effi-
cient functionalities of the GNSS infrastructure and thus they depend
on the correct and reliable geosecurity location information. As a con-
sequence of this growing demand, as a resource becomes spread and
useful among civil infrastructure, malicious agents attempt to disrupt
the GNSS services exploiting possible weakness inside the target sys-
tem.
interference in gnss
The widespread use of civil location-based applications is due to the
Global Positioning System (GPS), and more in general GNSS, signal
structure which is defined in a freely-available and open-access spec-
ification [24][72]. Due to the low received power at earth’s surface,
GNSS signals are highly vulnerable to the most common attack as
denial-of-service by jamming and intentional interference, which can
be effective also within a range of several kilometers. The GNSS ser-
vice deterioration is the result of natural disruptions, as ionospheric
and tropospheric effects, unintentional artificial effects, as multipath,
deliberate,intentional and malicious artificial effects, as jamming, mea-
coning and spoofing signals. In order to limit these deteriorating ef-
fects, it is necessary to design techniques against interfering signal
due to the increasing diffusion of the GNSS based applications. Sev-
eral types of interfering signals can affect GNSS operation in a differ-
ent manner and a main characterization in different groups can be
made. Thus, navigation system interfering signal can be divided in
intentional and unintentional, and thus in jamming and out of band
signals, respectively.
Unintentional
GNSS services can be deteriorated by Radio Frequency Interference
(RFI) generated by instruments that are not working properly. This
electronics elements can deny the service of navigation systems gen-
erating out-of-band frequencies that fall into the GNSS bands [83]. In
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[15] the attention has been focused on the effects of the Digital Video
Broadcast - Terrestrial (DVB-T) standard in the GNSS system. Authors
have studied and show that due to the large diffusion of the receiver
equipments for DVB-T system, this type of unintentional interferer
represents an important issue to be solved also because the corre-
sponding transmitters emit signals with a very close frequency to
GNSS band, causing a high interference level. However, harmonic sup-
pression capabilities of the antennas can reduce the effect of this kind
of interference. Moving from electronic devices, the more dangerous
non-intentional interfering signal occurs when the correct signal is af-
fected by multipath propagation. When a GNSS receiver is located in
a worse scenario as a urban canyon and it is not in Line of Sight (LOS),
its functionalities are highly corrupted due to the several delayed
replicas that are received, generated by the reflection of the useful
signal on obstacles surfaces surrounding the receiver. These delayed
replicas reduce the capabilities of the receiver in decoding and evalu-
ating the PVT solutions (the shape of the correlation peak is distorted)
and thus deteriorating the reception of the signal.
Intentional
The other main category is represented by the intentional interferer.
These signal are generated to deny intentionally services provided
by GNSS system. The scope of the jammer is to completely destroy
the communication between transmitter and receiver and to deny the
possibility of a correct exchange of information, and thus to receive
PVT solutions (especially in military domain). Several possible strate-
gies can be implemented by a jammer in order to be effective, and it
depends on the type of target to be jammed. Usually, jamming wave-
forms are modulated signals as continuous wave, pulsed continuous
wave, chirp signal. Electronic devices able to generate this jamming
waveform can be purchased on-line at a very low cost, thus being
available to be easily used. This Personal Privacy Device (PPD)s even
if generating a low power signal, can deny the correct reception to the
target and also to the closer receiver in a radius of less meters [31].
Among intentional interferer, also meaconing and spoofing signals
have to be considered. These signals belong to the category of struc-
tured interferer with the main scope to mislead the GNSS sending to it
a wrong PVT information, without any awareness by the receiver. Mea-
coning signal refer to the reception and the rebroadcast of the GNSS
signal aiming to confuse with a wrong time-alignment the target re-
ceiver. Usually, meaconing is generated using a low noise amplifier
and two passive antennas, without any navigation processor. On the
other hand, spoofer represents the counterfeit copy of the GNSS signal.
Among spoofer it is possible to discern simplistic spoofer, intermedi-
ate spoofer and sophisticated one. The first type is generated by a
GPS generator and a transmitting antenna. It is very easy to detect
simplistic spoofer signals because they are not able to duplicate or re-
produce the correct time-synchronization of the GNSS signal-in-space.
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The other types of spoofer signal are more complex. The intermedi-
ate and sophisticated spoofer is able to generate a malicious signal
that it is totally equal to the useful one. This jammer source can cor-
rectly estimate the right time-synchronization of the constellation in
view and consequently the receiver acquires and tracks this counter-
feit copy without knowing that a malicious attack is occurring. In
other words, under a spoofing or meaconing attack, a GNSS receiver
is providing PVT solutions with good signal quality measures even
if the position solutions do not represent the actual location of the
receiver.
motivation
Taking into account this ever-growing dependance on GNSS, due to
the several civil and safety existing applications, strong motivation
to attack civil GNSS infrastructure has increased, for either an illegit-
imate advantage or terrorism purposes. Due to the known structure
of the GNSS signal and for a non in-built security feature in the GNSS
open service, the design of a jamming source able to deteriorate the
correct operational function is becoming more feasible thanks to the
very low cost of the necessary equipment [36]. Consequently, all jam-
ming events and in particular the spoofer are becoming a serious is-
sue for the next-generation of the GNSS infrastructure, and techniques
capable to counteract these malicious attacks are required. The prin-
cipal problem is strictly correlated to the huge diversification of the
GNSS receivers; in other words, it is necessary to design detection and
mitigation methods that do not require big hardware modifications.
So far, several methods have been proposed to harden civil GNSS re-
ceiver against jamming attacks and in particular against spoofing ef-
fects. But in any case, civilian GNSS infrastructure is still subjected
and without any defense solution against this sophisticated attack.
conclusion
In summary, GNSS interference management research topic still presents
open challenge due to the wide application arena and to the growing
technological developments. In this dissertation the results of the re-
search carried out during my Ph.D. activity are presented, in the con-
text of structured interference management for satellite navigation
systems. This activity has been mainly characterized by the continu-
ous interaction with industrial partners within the framework of inter-
national research project [Pr1]. All the results of my activity provided
in this dissertation represent possible solutions to the problems en-
countered within the aforementioned project. The collaboration and
interaction with industrial partners have lead to a deeper comprehen-
sion of the requirement and of the trade-offs due to practical imple-
mentation. This opportunity has allowed to test the provided tech-
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niques with real data collected in a controlled scenario, satisfying the
practical requirements.
O R I G I N A L C O N T R I B U T I O N S
In this dissertation, the effects of interfering signal in satellite naviga-
tion systems have been studied and analyzed. Possible and innovative
techniques are provided with the aim of reduction of the jamming ef-
fects and thus to enhance the reliability and the functionality of the
GNSS receiver. It is worthwhile to underline that the scope of the thesis
is then trying to detect interferers and collect malicious signals from
the very statistical point of view taking into account that the GNSS
receiver aims to mitigate interfering effects rather than to detect it.
This consideration allows to deal with detection and characterization
of even very low-power jammers. The principal contribution of the
thesis regards with the jamming management technique in complex
scenarios. In the framework of the DETECTOR project [Pr1] a deep
description and overview of the interfering issue in satellite naviga-
tion systems has been carried out. Considering the main purpose of
the project, the PhD candidate has described and provided new ap-
proaches in detection and mitigation of jamming signals. In particular,
moving from scientistic previous references, interfering signal with
particular characteristics have been considered, evaluated from ex-
haustive measurement campaigns. From these results, an innovative
approach for the detection and above all for the mitigation of interfer-
ing signals has been designed [P4]. Moreover, a development of the
study-case is provided. The aforementioned detection and mitigation
techniques has been tested in a different scenarios, worse than the
previous one. The innovative aspect consists in the possibility of ap-
ply the already described methods to more complex scenario, as can
be the dispersive channel, and verify that they still properly work. In
other words, in this dissertation a general study of the interfering sig-
nal in a multipath scenario (urban canyon) is provided and numerical
results show that provided technique is still effective in detecting and
canceling the jamming waveform, with a slightly decreased perfor-
mance but without any increasing of the computational complexity
of the solution in [P4]. Furthermore, the attention has been focused
on a more sophisticated class of jamming signal, i. e.the spoofer. It is
well known that spoofing signals represent the most difficult kind of
signal to be detected and consequently to be mitigated. In the disserta-
tion, a possible and innovative approach is presented. This technique
is based on the jointly observation and evaluation of measurement
outputs from several blocks locating inside GNSS receiver. Through
these measurements, it is possible to define threshold in order to de-
tect the spoofer when it occurs. The results have been carried out by
observing real data collected in controlled scenario with different im-
xii
plementation and by evaluation from real-space GNSS signal collected
in airport station.
P E R S O N A L P U B L I C AT I O N S
[P1] Bartolucci, M; Casile, R.; Pojani, G.; Corazza, G.E.;, “Joint Jam-
mer Detection and Localization for Dependable GNSS," Position-
ing, Navigation and Timing (ION-PNT), 2015 International Confer-
ence on, April 2015 (SUBMITTED TO).
[P2] Bartolucci, M; Casile, R.; Gabelli, G.; Guidotti, A.; Corazza, G.E.;
“Distributed-Sensing Waveform Estimation for Interference Can-
cellation," Proceedings of the 27th International Technical Meeting of
the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+
2014), September 2014.
[P3] Bartolucci, M; Casile, R.; Corazza, G.E.; Durante, A.; Gabelli,
G.;Guidotti, A.;, “Cooperativedistributed localization and char-
acterization of GNSS jamming interference," Localization and GNSS
(ICL-GNSS), 2013 International Conference on, June 2013.
[P4] Gabelli, G.; Casile, R.; Guidotti, A.; Corazza, G.E.; “GNSS Jam-
ming Interference: Characterization and Cancellation," Proceed-
ings of the 2013 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of
Navigation, January 2013.
[P5] Gabelli, G.; Corazza, G.E.; Deambrogio, L.; Casile, R.; , “Code ac-
quisition under strong dynamics: The case of TT&C for LEOP,"
Advanced Satellite Multimedia Systems Conference (ASMS) and 12th
Signal Processing for Space Communications Workshop (SPSC), 2012.
P R O J E C T S
[Pr1] “Detection, Evaluation and Characterization of Threats to Road
Applications (DETECTOR)," FP7 Grant Agreement: 277619-2 -
in collaboration with Nottingham Scientific Limited (NSL), SANEF,
ARIC, Black Holes B.V. and IPSC.
xiii

C O N T E N T S
i interference management techniques 1
1 interference detection 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 System Model 4
1.3 Interference Band Detection 5
1.3.1 Performance Analysis 7
1.4 Interference Duty-Cycle Estimation 12
1.4.1 Duty-Cycle Estimation 13
1.4.2 Performance Analysis 16
1.5 Bandwidth Detection: Update and Validation 19
1.5.1 Bandwidth Detection Algorithm: Update Descrip-
tion 21
1.5.2 Bandwidth Detection: Validation Campaign 24
1.6 Conclusions 45
2 gnss jammer in multipath scenario 47
2.1 Introduction 47
2.2 System Model 48
2.3 Algorithm Description 49
2.3.1 Interferer Detection 50
2.3.2 Interferer Waveform Acquisition 54
2.3.3 Interferer Waveform Estimation 54
2.3.4 Interferer Waveform Mitigation 55
2.3.5 Complexity Evaluation 56
2.4 Non-dispersive Channel 58
2.4.1 Jamming Chirp 59
2.4.2 Jamming Chirp Autocorrelation Analysis 59
2.4.3 Numerical Results 62
2.4.4 Complexity Evaluation 71
2.5 Multipath Channel 72
2.5.1 System model 73
2.5.2 Autocorrelation Analysis 74
2.5.3 Detector Design 76
2.5.4 Numerical Results 78
2.5.5 Complexity Evaluation 89
2.6 Conclusions 91
ii spoofing threat 99
3 spoofing in gnss 101
3.1 Introduction 101
3.2 Literature Survey 102
3.3 Spoofing Detection: Signal Quality Monitoring techniques 105
3.4 Proposed Architecture 106
3.4.1 System model 107
3.4.2 Automatic Gain Control 107
3.4.3 Correlator 109
xv
xvi contents
3.4.4 C/N0 estimation 109
3.4.5 AGC & Correlator & C/N0 : A combined Tech-
nique 110
3.5 Numerical Results 111
3.5.1 Scenario 111
3.5.2 Simulation Results 111
3.6 Conclusions 123
bibliography 131
L I S T O F F I G U R E S
Figure 1 Band Detection - Block Diagram 6
Figure 2 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs]
and fmax = 8[MHz] 9
Figure 3 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs]
and fmax = 4[MHz] 10
Figure 4 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs]
and fmax = 2[MHz] 10
Figure 5 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs]
and fmax = 1[MHz] 11
Figure 6 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs]
and fmax = 8[MHz] 11
Figure 7 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs]
and fmax = 4[MHz] 12
Figure 8 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs]
and fmax = 2[MHz] 12
Figure 9 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs]
and fmax = 1[MHz] 13
Figure 10 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs]
and fmax = 8[MHz] 13
Figure 11 Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs]
and fmax = 8[MHz] 14
Figure 12 RMSE CFE @ Observation duration equal to
10[µs] and fmax = 8[MHz] 14
Figure 13 RMSE CFE @ Observation duration equal to
20[µs] and fmax = 8[MHz] 15
Figure 14 Duty Cycle Estimation - Block Diagram 15
Figure 15 Pmd,Pout@ Duty Cycle equal to 0.05 18
Figure 16 Pmd,Pout@ Duty Cycle equal to 0.5 18
Figure 17 Pmd,Pout@ Duty Cycle equal to 0.8 19
Figure 18 RMSE DC @ Duty cycle equal to 0.05 19
Figure 19 RMSE DC @ Duty cycle equal to 0.5 20
Figure 20 RMSE DC @ Duty cycle equal to 0.5 20
Figure 21 RMSE CIE @ Duty cycle equal to 0.05 21
Figure 22 RMSE CIE @ Duty cycle equal to 0.5 21
Figure 23 RMSE CIE @ Duty cycle equal to 0.8 22
Figure 24 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 25
Figure 25 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 26
Figure 26 Spectrogram - Urban Tones 27
Figure 27 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 27
Figure 28 Comparison PSD with LSP = 800 28
Figure 29 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 28
Figure 30 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 29
Figure 31 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 29
Figure 32 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 30
Figure 33 Spectrogram - Urban Wideband 30
xvii
xviii List of Figures
Figure 34 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 31
Figure 35 Spectrogram - Urban Wideband 32
Figure 36 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 32
Figure 37 Spectrogram - Urban Wideband 33
Figure 38 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 33
Figure 39 Spectrogram - Urban Tones 34
Figure 40 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 34
Figure 41 Comparison PSD with LSP = 800 35
Figure 42 Spectrogram - Urban Wideband 35
Figure 43 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 36
Figure 44 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 36
Figure 45 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 37
Figure 46 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 37
Figure 47 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 38
Figure 48 Spectrogram - Urban Wideband 39
Figure 49 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 39
Figure 50 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 40
Figure 51 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 40
Figure 52 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 41
Figure 53 Detection Test withA = 4 and LSP = [200, 400, 800] 42
Figure 54 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 42
Figure 55 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 43
Figure 56 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 43
Figure 57 Spectrogram - Urban Wideband 44
Figure 58 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 44
Figure 59 Spectrogram - Urban Chirp 45
Figure 60 Comparison PSD with LSP = 400 45
Figure 61 Interferer Detection - Block Diagram. 50
Figure 62 Interferer Acquisition - Block Diagram. 55
Figure 63 Interferer Estimation - Flow graph. 57
Figure 64 Fresnel integral approximation. 62
Figure 65 (a)Approximation accuracy vs. interfering sig-
nal bandwidth; (b) approximation accuracy vs.
interfering signal period. 63
Figure 66 Probability of Detection - Classic Detector. 65
Figure 67 Probability of Detection - Optimize Detector. 65
Figure 68 MSE vs JNRR - Fs/fM = 10− T = 10[µs] − L =
10 67
Figure 69 MSE vs JNRR - Fs/fM = 10− T = 25[µs] − L =
10 68
Figure 70 MSE vs JNRR - Fs/fM = 10− T = 50[µs] − L =
10 68
Figure 71 Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs,
L = 10 71
Figure 72 Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs,
L = 100 71
Figure 73 Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs,
L = 10 72
Figure 74 Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs,
L = 100 72
List of Figures xix
Figure 75 Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs,
L = 10 73
Figure 76 Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs,
L = 100 73
Figure 77 Multipath Scenario 79
Figure 78 Estimated Autocorrelation function of Multi-
path signal with 6 paths. 80
Figure 79 Zoom on Estimated Autocorrelation function
of Multipath signal with 6 paths. 80
Figure 80 Zoom on Estimated Autocorrelation function
of Multipath signal with 3 paths. 81
Figure 81 Zoom on Estimated Autocorrelation function
of Multipath signal with 3 paths. 81
Figure 82 Multipath - Probability of Detection. 83
Figure 83 Multipath - Probability of Detection. 83
Figure 84 Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs,
L = 10 84
Figure 85 Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs,
L = 100 85
Figure 86 Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs,
L = 10 85
Figure 87 Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs,
L = 100 86
Figure 88 Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs,
L = 10 86
Figure 89 Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs,
L = 100 87
Figure 90 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = −10dB−
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 88
Figure 91 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB−
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 88
Figure 92 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 10dB−
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 89
Figure 93 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 10dB−
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 100 89
Figure 94 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 10dB−
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 90
Figure 95 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB−
Fs/fM = 10− T = 10µs− L = 10 90
Figure 96 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB−
Fs/fM = 5− T = 10µs− L = 10 91
Figure 97 Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB−
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 91
Figure 98 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
−10dB− Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs−L = 10 92
Figure 99 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
0dB− Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 92
Figure 100 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
10dB− Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 93
xx List of Figures
Figure 101 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
10dB− Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 93
Figure 102 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
10dB− Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 100 94
Figure 103 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
0dB− Fs/fM = 10− T = 10µs− L = 10 94
Figure 104 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
0dB− Fs/fM = 5− T = 10µs− L = 10 95
Figure 105 Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR =
0dB− Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10 95
Figure 106 Typical GPS receiver with AGC shown 108
Figure 107 AGC gain for the baseline and three spoofed
scenarios 112
Figure 108 Correlation profile for the baseline and three
spoofed scenarios 113
Figure 109 Correlation metric 1 in baseline and three spoofed
scenarios 114
Figure 110 Correlation metric 2 in baseline and three spoofed
scenarios 114
Figure 111 Correlation metric 3 in baseline and three spoofed
scenarios 114
Figure 112 Automatic Gain Control of a free RFI station
115
Figure 113 Automatic Gain Control of a RFI station 115
Figure 114 AGC: comparison between FAI and ZMA-A
stations 116
Figure 115 FAI station: AGC gain level and histogram 116
Figure 116 ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and histogram 117
Figure 117 FAI station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN
14 117
Figure 118 ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN
14 118
Figure 119 ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN
18 119
Figure 120 ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN
21 119
Figure 121 ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN
22 120
Figure 122 ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN
24 120
Figure 123 FAI station: C/N0 PRN 14 envelope 121
Figure 124 FAI station: Metric 1 residual for the PRN 14 121
Figure 125 FAI station: Zoom on C/N0 PRN 14 envelope 121
Figure 126 FAI station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the
PRN 14 122
Figure 127 ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 14 envelope 122
Figure 128 ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the
PRN 14 122
Figure 129 ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 18 envelope 122
Figure 130 ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the
PRN 18 123
Figure 131 ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 21 envelope 123
Figure 132 ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the
PRN 21 123
Figure 133 ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 22 envelope 123
Figure 134 ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the
PRN 22 124
Figure 135 ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 24 envelope 124
Figure 136 ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the
PRN 24 124
L I S T O F TA B L E S
Table 1 Simulation parameters for frequency charac-
terization 8
Table 2 Algorithm parameters for frequency character-
ization 9
Table 3 Simulation parameters for duty cycle estima-
tion 17
Table 4 Algorithm parameters for frequency character-
ization 17
Table 5 Update parameters for frequency characteriza-
tion 25
Table 6 Detection - Simulation Parameter 64
Table 7 Estimation - Simulation Parameter 67
Table 8 Cancellation Parameter 70
Table 9 Simulation Parameters 79
Table 10 Detection - Simulation Parameter 82
Table 11 Cancellation - Simulation Parameter 87
Table 12 Spoofing Scenario Parameters 111
A C R O N Y M S
AWGN Additive White Gaussian Noise
AC Autocorrelation
AGC Automatic Gain Control
AOA Angle Of Arrival
xxi
xxii acronyms
BOC Binary Offset Carrier
CIE Central Instant Error
CN0 Carrier-to-Noise Ratio
CRB Cramer Rao Bound
DC Duty Cycle
DFT Discrete Fourier Transform
DLL Delay Lock Loop
DOA Direction of Arrival
DVB-T Digital Video Broadcast - Terrestrial
ESD Energy Spectral Density
FFT Fast Fourier Transform
FM Frequency Modulated
FT Fourier Transform
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS Global Positioning System
ICC Interference Characterization and Cancellation
IFFT Inverse FFT
IIR Infinite Impulse Response
JNR Jammer-to-Noise Ratio
LNA Low Noise Amplifier
LOS Line of Sight
ML Maximum Likelihood
MSE Mean Square Error
OD Obsevation Duration
PLL Phase-Locked Loop
PM Phase Modulated
PPD Personal Privacy Device
PRN Pseudorandom Noise
PSD Power Spectral Density
PVT Position-Velocity-Time
RAIM Receive Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
acronyms xxiii
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RMS Root Mean Square
RMSE Root Mean Square Error
SQM Signal Quality Monitoring
TDOA Time Difference Of Arrival
WT Wavelet Transform

Part I
I N T E R F E R E N C E M A N A G E M E N T T E C H N I Q U E S
Due to their low power levels, GNSS signals are highly sus-
ceptible to both intentional and unintentional RFI sources
disruptions. The increasing diversification of everyday life
applications based on satellite navigation systems requires
a high reliability of the communication link, in each step
from the transmission to the reception one, above all for
the safety-critical applications [45]. Jamming signals, which
can deteriorate or even deny the provided GNSS services,
and unintentional RFI sources, as malfunctioning elements,
represent a paramount problem in GNSS operating chain.
Thus, the problem of how to face RFI, and in particular
the intentional one, has become a hot topic in recent years
[12], [P4],[9]. For this reason, it is necessary to define solu-
tions able to guarantee and to maintain the GNSS service
and reliability in presence of such threats.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the problem and to
propose new solutions able to counteract interfering sig-
nals. In particular, the main aim is to design techniques in
order to detect the presence of interfering signals, to local-
ize the malicious sources, and to mitigate and reduce their
effects.

1
I N T E R F E R E N C E D E T E C T I O N
1.1 introduction
The diversity of the GNSS [58] based applications in the majority of
the human life habits increases its importance and consequently its
vulnerability against malicious attacks. As well known, the GNSS sig-
nals hare broadcast and received at a very low power level at the
receiver side and for this reason are very vulnerable to the RFI effects,
both unintentionally and intentionally generated [45]. The malicious
attacks aim to degrade the performance of all that systems and appli-
cations based on correct information of timing and positioning pro-
vided by the GNSS, leading to the complete disruption of the service
[8][7][61][13][33]. The higher the jamming power, the more danger-
ous the consequence on the GNSS quality of service. Due to these
powerful issues, it is necessary to design techniques able to contrast
interfering effects and to minimize their disruptive aims. The first
step is to identify if an interferer is present or not. In literature, sev-
eral detection techniques have been proposed based on the analysis
of signal outputs of blocks in the reception chain as Automatic Gain
Control (AGC) [32], Carrier-to-Noise Ratio (CN0) evaluation [39] and
cooperative techniques which exploit correlator metric information
from distributed nodes [70]. The major part of detection techniques
is essentially based on the Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) and An-
gle Of Arrival (AOA) estimation methods and some research works
analyzed also the Direction of Arrival (DOA) estimates [71]; some re-
searchers also studied a possible combination of the cited techniques
[18].
Instead, in this work a different interference detection approach is
presented. The method is performed in the frequencies domain, thus
exploiting spectral signatures of the jamming signals, moving from
the above cited and widely used localization techniques. Our tech-
nique exploits the Wavelet Transform (WT) of the Power Spectral Den-
sity (PSD) of the interfering signal. By means of the time-scale trans-
form, it is possible to detect discontinuities in the received signal spec-
trum, corresponding to the higher values of the wavelet coefficients.
Once transients are detected it is possible to estimate the bandwidth
of the jamming signal and to evaluate the mean spectral energy. Fur-
thermore, this method is also applied in the time-domain in order to
define the time envelope of the received signal. The goal is to deter-
mine the duty cycle of the signal, and so the periodical repetition of
the interfering event. The algorithms have been thoroughly described,
and validated by means of numerical simulations and results with
both synthetized signal by MATLAB tool and collected data in con-
trolled scenarios [Pr1].
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: in Section 1.2 the sys-
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tem model is present; in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 the approaches
in the frequency domain and time domain are described, and vali-
dated by performance evaluation and numerical results, respectively;
in Section 1.5 an update version of the frequency domain approach is
described with several numerical results obtained by testing our algo-
rithm with data, collected in controlled scenario. Concluding remarks
are given in Section 1.6
1.2 system model
Previously an introduction to the most common approaches for inter-
ference detection in GNSS has been provided. As already explained,
the interfering signals aim to deteriorate the communication between
transmitter and receiver. The malicious signal is received with the
useful signal trying to corrupt the receiver’s capabilities in decoding
correct information and PVT solutions. The received signal at the tar-
get device can be expressed as [28][65]:
r(t) =
Ns∑
k=1
√
Pksk (t− τk) e
j(θk+2pifkt) (1)
+
√
PIsI (t− τI) e
j(θI+2pifIt) +w(t)
where Ns is the number of satellite signals, Pk and PI are the useful
signal power of the k-th satellite and the interference power, respec-
tively; τk, fk, θk and τI, fI, θI are the time delay, frequency and phase
offset of the useful signal and the interfering signal respectively, w(t)
is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) with power spectral
density equal to σ2w. Considering bicA = b iAc and |i|A = i mod A, the
k-th satellite signal can be expressed as [28]:
sk(t) =
+∞∑
l=−∞Dk (blcLs)ak (blcLs)g (t− lTc) (2)
whereDk(l) is the data sequence, ak(l) is the pseudo-random spread-
ing sequence transmitted by the k-th satellite, Ls is the spreading se-
quence length and g(t) is the filter response with a limited support
of [0, Tc], where Tc is the chip period. The whole frequency band of
the GNSS was firstly divided in two bands:
• Upper L band: f ∈ [1559− 1610]MHz to which Glonass G1, GPS
L1 and Galileo E1 belong;
• Lower L band: f ∈ [1151− 1214]MHz to which Glonass G3, GPS
L5, Galileo E5 belong.
Successively, GPS L2, Glonass G3 and Galileo E6 have been located in
the remaining frequencies f ∈ [1215.6− 1350]MHz for radio-location
services. This is the reason why this partial band is more susceptible
to the interfering than the previous ones. However, in the following
the upper L band will be considered and the effects of the interfering
signal will be analyzed. Now, a description of the considered interfer-
ing signals is carried out. The most common GNSS interfering signals
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are defined by periodic envelope, with particular Autocorrelation (AC)
function characteristics [12],[48]. Current interfering waveforms are
defined by angle modulated signals which have a periodic core z(t).
They can be written as:
s
FM
(t) = A exp
{
j2pi
(
f0t+
∫t
−∞ z(ξ)dξ
)}
(3)
s
PM
(t) = A exp {j2pi (f0t+ z(t))} (4)
which correspond to Frequency Modulated (FM) and Phase Modu-
lated (PM), respectively. For a generic and periodic modulation func-
tion
z(t) =
∑
k
z0(t− kT) (5)
and consequently the equations (3) and (4) can be rewritten, respec-
tively, as:
s
FM
(t) =
∑
k
Aks¯FM(t− kT)e
ΘFM(k) (6)
s
PM
(t) =
∑
k
Aks¯PM(t− kT)e
ΘPM(k) (7)
These signals are defined as structured signals due to their peri-
odic core waveform. Due to these properties, they can be classified
as parametric waveforms because by exploiting AC characteristics it
is possible to represents them by means of specific parameters, esti-
mated by tracking the periodic waveform. However, it is worthwhile
to notice that among interfering signals also non parametric wave-
forms are presents. These kind of signals do not present periodic en-
velope and consequently particular AC characteristics and thus they
cannot be identified by a parametric representation. Non-parametric
waveforms represent a more difficult family of interfering signals that
are more difficult to characterize and classify simply because a priori
information is not available. Accordingly, solutions to detect and es-
timate this kind of signals are the spectrum estimation techniques
and time-scale and time-frequency mathematical tool, able to extract
primary information from the received signal [53].
1.3 interference band detection
As mentioned previously, several interference detection techniques
have been proposed and deeply discussed in literature. By exploit-
ing the well known WT [21], it is possible to estimate the interference
bandwidth, for both structured and non-structured interference. In
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the last case, bandwidth estimation is one of the few information re-
garding the received interfering signal. In [25] and [54] interference
mitigation algorithms that exploit WT are presented. This mathemati-
cal tool allows for identification and reconstruction of the interfering
signal due to the split in the time-scale domain from the useful sig-
nal, with interesting results in terms of mitigation purposes. The basic
idea is to use the wavelet coefficients, the output of the WT on the PSD
of the signal, as the identifiers of the transient processes in the PSD
envelope. In particular, the discontinuities of the signal correspond to
high values of the wavelet coefficients. Once the discontinuities have
been detected, the PSD samples to which a high coefficient value corre-
spond are identified, and it is thus possible to localize the signal in the
frequency domain, and to evaluate the mean interference energy. The
characterization algorithm identifies the bands inside which most of
the interfering signal energy is concentrated. More in particular, this
algorithm provide means to determine how the interfering signal is
distributed in the frequency domain, and consequently it is possible
to determine the number and the dimension of the interfered band-
widths. The Band Detection algorithm exploits the WT of the received
signal PSD in order to detect interfered bands. By means of the WT, it
is possible to identify where any discontinuities is localized. The pro-
posed algorithm is described by the pseudo code in the algorithm1
and shown in the block diagram in Figure (1).
Frequency Characterization & Band Detection;
;
1) r¯ = {r(nTs) : kOD < nTs < (k+ 1)OD};
;
2) S¯ = |fft(r¯)|2;
;
3) a¯ = [a1, . . . ,aNs ] = [2
1, . . . , 2Ns ];
;
4) W(n,a) =
[
Wa1 ? S¯, . . . ,WaNs ? §¯
]
;
;
5) P(n) =
∏Ns
a=1 |W(n,a)|;
;
6) F = {n : P(n) > ξWT };
;
7) B = {[F(i),F(i+ 1)] :; 1F(i+1)−F(i) ;
∑F(i+1)
j=F(i) S¯(j);> Aσ
2};
;
Algorithmus 1 : Frequency Characterization & Band Detection
Figure 1: Band Detection - Block Diagram
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The procedure consists in sampling the received signal in a time
window of Obsevation Duration (OD)(line 1) and then the PSD is cal-
culated (line 2). In order to perform WT it is necessary to select the
scale factors, according to the resolution to be achieved. The scale fac-
tors have been chosen to be the set of powers of 2, ranging from 2
to 2Ns (line 3). The time-scale transform is then evaluated for each
scale factor, which identifies different frequency bands with different
resolutions. The chosen mother wavelet is the Haar wavelet function
φ(t) defined as:
φ(t) =

1 0 < t < 1/2
−1 −1/2 < t < 0
0 otherwise
For each scale factor the WT can be implemented as the convolution
between the wavelet function and the signal S¯ (line 4). The output of
the convolution is a matrix with each row corresponding to a scale
factor and each column corresponding to a time instant. If a disconti-
nuity is present in the PSD envelope, the wavelet coefficient, obtained
from the convolution, is very high. Through this analysis it is pos-
sible to identify the discontinuities of the signal, in particular when
and also where, at which sample, the signal shows transients. Subse-
quently, for each time instant, the product of the absolute values of
the wavelet transform corresponding to the different scale factors is
calculated, as indicated in line (5). The rationale is that if a PSD dis-
continuity exists for a certain frequency value, this results in a high
wavelet transform, for all the scale factors; taking the product of the
absolute values helps eliminating undesired peaks due to noise. Fre-
quencies corresponding to peaks of the sequence obtained as result
of the previous product are selected. In order to eliminate undesired
measurements due to noise a comparison with a threshold is per-
formed, as indicated at line (6). The power of each detected interferer
band, comprised between two successive detected frequencies, is com-
pared to a threshold, and only those bands in which the mean power
spectral density crosses the threshold are identified (line 7).
1.3.1 Performance Analysis
The performance evaluation for the above algorithm is presented be-
low.
1.3.1.1 Performance Evaluation Criteria
The chosen performance evaluation criteria are the Probability of Missed
Detection (Pmd) and the Probability of Outlier (Pout). We define Pmd as
the probability of not-detecting the presence of the interfering signal
within the interfered band. On the other hand, we identify Pout as the
probability of detecting at least an interfered band event outside the
ideal interferer interval. These kinds of detected events are classified
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J0/N0 [0, 5, 10, 15] [dB]
Minimum frequency 0.5 [MHz]
Maximum Frequency [8, 4, 2, 1]
Table 1: Simulation parameters for frequency characterization
as outliers because they are detected outside the real interferer signal
and so they are the results of a wrong detection analysis. Under the
hypothesis of correct detection, we also evaluate the accuracy of the
bandwidth measurements. In particular, we evaluate the mean error
of estimation of the central frequency fc defined as
ec =
√
E
[
|fˆc − fc|2
]
(8)
defined as the difference between the estimated central frequency of
the interfered band and the estimated central frequency, and the error
of the estimated bandwidth
ec =
√
E
[
|Bˆ−B|2
]
(9)
defined as the difference between the estimated bandwidth and the
interfered bandwidth. Previous errors have been estimated by means
of Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) for both the central frequency error
(RMSE CFE) and the bandwidth error (RMSE BE).
1.3.1.2 Scenario
Simulation tests are carried out considering an interfering signal em-
bedded in Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) with a power spec-
tral density ratio J0/N0 ranging from 0 to 15 dB. We consider wide
band interfering signal with power lower than the saturation level.
The minimum frequency is set equal to 500kHz and the maximum
frequency is determined from the fs/fmax factor, which interval is
set equal to [2.5, 5, 10, 15].
1.3.1.3 Algorithm Optimization
In the following the parameters characterizing the algorithm are pre-
sented. The parameters are resumed in table 2. An observation du-
ration OD equal to 10, 20[µs] has been considered in order to follow
also rapid variations of the signal frequency characteristics. The num-
ber of scales factors considered has been calculated according to the
dimension of the observable length. In particular maximum wavelet
duration equal to one fourth of the observable duration has been con-
sidered. A wavelet threshold equal to twice the variance of noise after
the wavelet transform has been considered. This is due to the fact that,
according to the Central Limit Theorem, the distribution of the Haar
wavelet transform of the square of a noise sequence with i.i.d. sam-
ples distributed as Gaussian random variables with zero mean and
variance σ2 (∼ N(0,σ2)), converges to a Gaussian random variable
with zero mean variance equal to 2σ2 (∼ N(0, 2σ2)). Different values
for the last verification threshold are selected as shown in table 2
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Sampling Frequency fs 20 [MHz]
Observation Duration OD 10, 20[µs]
Number of scales factors Ns round((log2(OD))-2)
Wavelet threshold ξWT 2(2σ2)Ns
Mean PSD threshold Aσ2 A=[1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15]
Table 2: Algorithm parameters for frequency characterization
1.3.1.4 Numerical Results
In this section the numerical results of the performance of the Band
Detector algorithm are presented. In Figures [2,3,4,5] the probability
of missed detection and probability of outlier with observation dura-
tion equal to 10[µs] are presented. It is possible to observe that both
the probabilities increase as the ratio fs/fmax becomes higher, that is,
with decreasing maximum frequency. This is in line with the expec-
tations since for constant J0/N0 the signal power decreases with its
bandwidth, thus becoming less visible.
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Figure 2: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs] and fmax =
8[MHz]
On the other hand, in Figures [6,7,8,9], the probability of missed
detection and probability of outlier behaviors are respectively shown
considering the observation duration equal to 20[µs]. In this case the
performance result to be better than in the previous case, but still the
probabilities increase with decreasing maximum frequency.
The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) for the bandwidth estima-
tion error has been evaluated considering fs/fmax = 2.5(fmax =
8MHz) and the observation window at 10, 20[µs]. As shown in Fig-
ures [[10,11]], the RMSE values saturate for J0/N0 = 0, but decreases
rapidly when the interferer becomes more visible, resulting in errors
of magnitude of 10−3 for the best case.
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Figure 3: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs] and fmax =
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Figure 4: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs] and fmax =
2[MHz]
A similar behavior is shown for the Root Mean Square (RMS) of the
central frequency estimation error. As shown in Figures [12,13], no
significant information is provided by the algorithm in case J0/N0 =
0, but it becomes rapidly precise with increasing interference to noise
ratio. Moreover, it is possible to observe that a little gain can be ob-
tained by considering longer observables.
1.3.1.5 Numerical Complexity
The numerical complexity of the Band detection block is principally
defined by the complexity of the Wavelet Transform WT. The com-
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Figure 5: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs] and fmax =
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Figure 6: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs] and fmax =
8[MHz]
plexity of the algorithm, expressed in terms of number of needed
operations, is given by the following:
• O
(
OD
2 log2(OD)
)
products and sums for the or the calculation
of the signal Fast Fourier Transform (FFT);
• OD products needed for the calculation of the power spectral
density;
• OD
(
2Ns+1 − 2
)
products and sums, for the calculation of the
incoming signal Wavelet Transform WT;
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Figure 7: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs] and fmax =
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Figure 8: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs] and fmax =
2[MHz]
• ODNs multiplications for calculation of the wavelet product ar-
ray;
• OD sums for the calculation of the band mean power spectral
density.
1.4 interference duty-cycle estimation
A different approach for the characterization of a structured signal
consists in identifying the duration of the activity period of the in-
terferers. It is well known that for pulsed or short burst interferers,
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Figure 9: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs] and fmax =
1[MHz]
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Figure 10: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 10[µs] and fmax =
8[MHz]
management techniques like blanking can be very effective; so the
identification of the interfered time-intervals can be crucial for the
proper success of these algorithms.
1.4.1 Duty-Cycle Estimation
The estimation of the interfering intervals in time domain is per-
formed by the Duty Cycle Estimation algorithm. The duty cycle can be
determined by estimating the period of the signal and the period of
activity of the jamming source. The first task, as already shown, can
be performed by exploiting the autocorrelation properties of the inter-
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Figure 11: Pmd,Pout@ Observation duration equal to 20[µs] and fmax =
8[MHz]
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Figure 12: RMSE CFE @ Observation duration equal to 10[µs] and fmax =
8[MHz]
fering signals, thus by exploiting the results of the structure detection
and of the waveform estimation algorithms. On the other hand, the es-
timation of the time-interval of activity of an interferer can be carried
out by considering the approach proposed for the frequency char-
acterization. The detection and measurement of an interfering signal
time burst can be dealt with as for a limited band in the frequency do-
main. The proposed algorithm thus exploits the technique proposed
for frequency characterization for the estimation of the activity period
of the interfering signals.
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Figure 13: RMSE CFE @ Observation duration equal to 20[µs] and fmax =
8[MHz]
Duty-Cycle Estimation;
;
1) Tˆ ;
;
2) r¯ = {r(nTs) : kT < nTs < (k+ 1)T };
;
3) Y¯ = |r¯|2;
;
4) a¯ = [a1, . . . ,aNs ] = [2
1, . . . , 2Ns ];
;
5) W(n,a) =
[
Wa1 ? Y¯, . . . ,WaNs ? Y¯
]
;
;
6) P(n) =
∏Ns
a=1 |W(n,a)|;
;
7) T = {n : P(n) > ξWT };
;
8) I = {[T(i),T(i+ 1)] : 1T(i+1)−T(i) ;
∑T(i+1)
j=T(i) Y¯(j);> Aσ
2};
;
9) DC = I/Tˆ ;
;
Algorithmus 2 : Duty-Cycle Estimation
Figure 14: Duty Cycle Estimation - Block Diagram
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As the Band Detection algorithm, the Duty Cycle Estimation can be
described according to the pseudo-code in Algorithm 2 and shown in
block diagram in Figure (14). Firstly, the period estimate from the AC
analysis is considered (line 1) in order to define each signal period
repetition. In line 3 the energy of the signal is computed. In order to
perform WT it is necessary to select the scale factor, according to the
resolution to be achieved. The scale factors have been chosen to be
the set of powers of 2, ranging from 2 to 2Ns (line 4). The time-scale
transform is then evaluated for each scale factor (line 5) and the prod-
uct of all the WT outputs is performed (line 6). In order to eliminate
undesired measurements due to noise a comparison with a thresh-
old is performed, as indicated in line 7. The power of each interfering
interval is calculated and successively compared with a threshold pro-
portional to the noise power. Finally, the duty-cycle of the interfering
signal is estimated as the ratio between the detected intervals and the
period estimate. The main difference with respect to the previously
presented results consists in the evaluation of the power envelope of
the signal, as indicated at line (3) since, in this case, the time char-
acteristics must be obtained. The algorithm provides information on
both the burst localization and on the duty-cycle values.
1.4.2 Performance Analysis
1.4.2.1 Performance Evaluation Criteria
As for the previous case performance has been evaluated in terms
of probability of detection Pmd and in terms of probability of outlier
Pout. Moreover, in order to evaluate the accuracy of the proposed
solution, the mean error
ec =
√
E
(
|tˆc − tc|2
)
(10)
defined as the difference between the estimated central instant of the
interfering burst signal and the real instant, and the mean error
eD =
√
E
(
|Iˆ− I|2
)
(11)
defined as the difference between the duration estimation and the
real burst duration, have been estimated.
1.4.2.2 Scenario
As for the previous case, simulation tests are carried out considering
an interfering signal embedded in AWGN with an interfering signal
power to noise ratio J/N ranging from 0 to 15 [dB]. We consider sig-
nals with a period equal to 10 and 20[µs]. The generated signals are
chirp signals with instantaneous frequencies rapidly growing over
the receiver bandwidth, thus generating duty cycle values equal to
0.05, 0.5 and 0.8. Parameters are shown in table 3.
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Interference-to-Noise-Ratio J/N [0, 5, 10, 15] [dB]
Signal Period T 10, 20[µs]
Duty Cycle DC [0.05, 0.5, 0.8]
Table 3: Simulation parameters for duty cycle estimation
Sampling Frequency fs 20 [MHz]
Observation Duration OD 10, 20[µs]
Number of scales factors Ns round((log2(OD))-2)
Wavelet threshold ξWT 2(2σ2)Ns
Mean PSD threshold Aσ2 A=[1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15]
Table 4: Algorithm parameters for frequency characterization
1.4.2.3 Algorithm Optimization
The same criterion used for the optimization of the algorithm for the
frequency domain characterization has been considered. The charac-
teristic parameters are resumed in Table 4:
• The number of scales factors considered has been calculated
according to the dimension of estimated signal period.
• A wavelet threshold equal to twice the variance of noise after
the wavelet transform has been considered.
• Various values for the last verification threshold are selected,
shown in table 4
1.4.2.4 Numerical Results
Figures [15,16,17] show the performance of the probability of missed
detection and of the probability of false alarm, when an outlier is
detected. As the results for the frequency domain, detection perfor-
mance increases with increasing duty cycle since, with longer signal
duration, the wavelet transform give rise to more relevant peaks. On
the other hand, probability of false alarm can be easily controlled by
selecting the appropriate threshold value.
The RMS for the duty cycle estimation is shown in Figures [18,19,20].
It can be noticed that the RMS is in the order of 10−2 for low J/N val-
ues when the duty cycle Duty Cycle (DC) is set to 0.05. This first value
is lower than those obtained in the successive cases with DC values
equal to 0.5 and 0.8, respectively. In these other cases, the RMS is in
the order of 10−1 for low J/N values and in the latter case it is bigger
than in the former one. The difference of the magnitude of RMS duty
cycle estimation error between 0.05, 0.5, 0.8 cases at low J/N values is
due to the behavior of the proposed algorithm which is completely
driven by noise: in fact, the false alarm probability due to the detec-
tion of narrow intervals is larger than that due to the detection of
longer intervals. Taking into account these properties, the error in the
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Figure 15: Pmd,Pout@ Duty Cycle equal to 0.05
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Figure 16: Pmd,Pout@ Duty Cycle equal to 0.5
detection of narrow signals is smaller than that related to the detec-
tion of the longer ones. Looking at the figures, it can be observed that
there is an intersection between the curves. We distinguished three
threshold values A set as integer multiples of the noise power. Fur-
thermore, we considered A = 3,A = 5,A = 7 represented with blue,
red, and black lines, respectively. As it can be noticed, the blue line
crosses the others for high J/N values. This is possible because the
selected threshold value is always lower than the other two and so it
is less selective, causing a higher RMS value.
In conclusion, the performance evaluations in terms of RMS of the
central interfered instant estimation error Central Instant Error (CIE)
are shown in Figures [21,22,23]. As it can be noticed, the RMSE become
larger with the increasing of the duty cycle value. Thus, as seen for the
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Figure 18: RMSE DC @ Duty cycle equal to 0.05
duty cycle error estimation, the RMSE is, with low J/N values, smaller
for short signals than for larger ones. For high J/N values, the blue
line, related to threshold A = 3 , crosses the other two, related to
threshold A = 5, A = 7, red and black line respectively, and it is due
to the fact that the threshold is lower and so it is less selective than
the other two, as seen in the duty cycle error estimation case.
1.5 bandwidth detection : update and validation
As previously described in 1.3, the aim of the Bandwidth Detection
algorithm is to identify the bands in which most of the interfering
20 interference detection
0 5 10 15
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
 J/N [dB]
 
R
M
SE
   
DC
RMSE DC @ DC = 0.5
 
 
Threshold A=3
Threshold A=5
Threshold A=7
Figure 19: RMSE DC @ Duty cycle equal to 0.5
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Figure 20: RMSE DC @ Duty cycle equal to 0.5
signal energy is concentrated. Such task is performed by applying the
WT on the received signal PSD. By means of the WT, it is possible to
identify the transient processes in the PSD envelope, thus allowing the
localization of each discontinuity. In the following, a brief description
of the algorithm is provided, with an update with respect to 1.3 due to
the proper consideration of the RF front-end bandpass characteristics,
and the results for a complete validation campaign are shown.
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Figure 21: RMSE CIE @ Duty cycle equal to 0.05
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Figure 22: RMSE CIE @ Duty cycle equal to 0.5
1.5.1 Bandwidth Detection Algorithm: Update Description
The update algorithm is described by the pseudo-code in the algo-
rithm 3:
The procedure consists in:
• Sampling the received signal on a time window of duration OD
as expressed in line (1). The obtained signal has a number of
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Figure 23: RMSE CIE @ Duty cycle equal to 0.8
samples define by the product OD ∗ fs, , where fs, is the sam-
pling frequency.
• The PSD S¯(f) is calculated through the Fourier Transform, as
defined in line (2).
• The PSD is limited to the front-end bandwidth BN, where no
attenuation is present, as shown in line (3).
• The noise energy level is estimated by averaging the received
signal power over N successive non-interfered observation win-
dows.
• The PSD is down-sampled, as shown in line (5), in order to trans-
form the received signal power spectral density vector of length
LS, into a shorter vector, SR(f), of length LSP, thus limiting the
overall algorithm complexity. The new PSD vector has a shorter
number of samples, which depends only on the desired signal
length.
• The scale factors of the wavelet transform are selected as indi-
cated at line (6). The scale factor have been chosen to be the set
of powers of 2 ranging from 2 to 2Ns .
• The WT of SR(f) is calculated as indicated at line (7) for each of
the scale factors previously selected. The Haar wavelet function
φ(t) was considered as mother wavelet, defined in eq.(??).For
each scale factor the WT can be implemented as the convolu-
tion between the wavelet function φ(t) and S¯R(f). The output
of the WT is a matrix where the rows correspond to the scale
factors and the columns to the time instants. If a discontinuity
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Frequency Characterization & Band Detection;
;
1) r¯ = {r(nTs) : kOD < nTs < (k+ 1)OD};
;
2) S¯ = |fft(r¯)|2;
;
3) s¯(f) : {f ∈ [−BN,BN]};
;
4) σˆ2 = 1N
∑
i
(
1
Nf
∑
f Sˆi(f)
)
;
;
5) SˆR(f) = downsample
(
S¯(f)
)
;
;
6) a¯ = [a1, . . . ,aNs ] = [2
1, . . . , 2Ns ];
;
7) W(n,a) =
[
Wa1 ? S¯, . . . ,WaNs ? S¯
]
;
;
8) P(n) =
∏Ns
s=1 |W(n, s)|;
;
9) F = {n : P(n) > ξWT };
;
10) B = {[F(i),F(i+ 1)] :; 1F(i+1)−F(i) ;
∑F(i+1)
j=F(i) S¯(j);> Aσ
2};
;
Algorithmus 3 : Frequency Characterization & Band Detection
is present in the PSD envelope, the wavelet coefficient is very
high. Through this analysis it is thus possible to identify any
discontinuity of the signal, in particular when and also where
(at which sample) the signal presents transients.
• For each time instant, the product of the absolute values of the
WT corresponding to the different scale factors is calculated, as
indicated at line (8). The rationale is that if a PSD discontinuity
exists for a certain frequency value, this results in a high WT
coefficient, for all the scale factors; taking the product of the
absolute values helps eliminating undesired peaks due to noise.
• Those frequencies corresponding to peaks of the sequence ob-
tained as result of the previous product are selected. In order
to avoid peak selection triggered by noise, a comparison with a
threshold is performed, as indicated at line (9).
• The power of each detected interferer band, included between
two successive detected frequencies, is compared to a threshold,
and only those bands in which the mean power spectral density
is above the threshold are identified (line (10)).
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1.5.2 Bandwidth Detection: Validation Campaign
The validation campaign has been performed considering real inter-
ference signals collected in an urban scenario. It has been possible
to observe that these signals consist in different types of waveforms,
such as single tones, chirps. As previously stated, the algorithm aims
at detecting the interfered bandwidth inside the spectrum of the re-
ceived signal.
1.5.2.1 Bandwidth Detection: Algorithm Optimization
In the following the parameters characterizing the algorithm are pre-
sented. In particular:
• An observation duration OD equal to 1ms has been considered
in order to track the envelope of the interference.
• The signal length is defined as the product between the obser-
vation window OD and the sampling frequency fs.
• The normalized bandwidth BN is defined as the frequency in-
terval not afflicted by the front-end filter attenuation.
• The shorter signal S¯R(f) to be processed is evaluated through
the down-sampling of the original signal S¯(f), extracting a sam-
ple every step interval: S¯R(f) = S¯(f)([1 : step : LSP]). The step
parameter depends on the desired final signal length LSP.
• The number of scale factors has been calculated according to
the signal length after the down-sampling. In particular, a max-
imum wavelet duration equal to one fourth of the observable
duration has been considered.
• A wavelet threshold, equal to twice the estimated noise level,
after the wavelet transform has been considered. This is due to
the fact that, according to the Central Limit Theorem, the distri-
bution of the Haar wavelet transform of the square of a noise se-
quence with i.i.d. samples distributed as Gaussian random vari-
ables with zero mean and variance σ2 (∼ N(0,σ2)), converges
to a Gaussian random variable with zero mean variance equal
to 2σ2(∼ N(0, 2σ2)).
• Different values for the power verification threshold have been
selected as indicated in table 5.
1.5.2.2 BD Numerical Results
In this section, the results of the validation campaign for the Band
Detector algorithm are presented by comparing the measured power
spectral density functions with the detected bands. Moreover, the re-
ceived signal spectrograms are shown in order to check the correct be-
havior of the detection algorithm. It is worth to highlight that detected
interferer bandwidths are defined in terms of normalized frequencies
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Sampling Frequency fs 16 [MHz]
Observation Duration OD 1[ms]
Signal Length LS 16000 samples
Number of Realizations N 100
Normalized Bandwidth BN [−0.35, 0.35]
Shorter Signal Length LSP 400 samples
Number of scales factors Ns round((log2(LSP)) − 2)
Wavelet threshold ξWT 2(2σ2)Ns
Mean PSD threshold Aσ2 A = [2, 4, 8]
Table 5: Update parameters for frequency characterization
reversed by the down-conversion. For example, an interferer normal-
ized bandwidth equal to [−0.3, 0.3] translates to an actual bandwidth
of [−4.8, 4.8]MHz relative to the L1 central frequency 1575.42MHz. In
Figure 24, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr15_time0
360_0380_B is shown. Through the spectrogram it is possible to ob-
serve that the considered signal is a chirp waveform, with a normal-
ized bandwidth of 0.7 (which corresponds to the RF Front-End band-
width). More specifically, it is possible to observe that most of the
interferer energy is contained in two frequency intervals, [−0.3, 0.1]
and [0.1, 0.3].
Figure 24: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
In Figure 25, the comparison between the power spectral density of
the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown. It
can be noticed that the algorithm recognizes the interferer bandwidth,
and the detection becomes more and more accurate for increasing
values of the power threshold. For a threshold A = 2 (green line),
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the recognized bandwidth ranges from −0.35to 0.35, and thus the
whole bandwidth is detected. For a threshold A = 4 (black line), the
detected bandwidth ranges from −0.3 to 0.28. For the last threshold,
A = 8 (pink line), the bandwidth ranges from −0.28 to 0.26. It is
worthwhile noticing that for increasing values of the power threshold
the detected bandwidth decreases, thus enabling the detection of the
most interfered part or the received signal.
Figure 25: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 26, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr16_tim
e0900_1000_B is shown. In particular, four single tones with different
powers are provided. The tones are in different frequency intervals:
the most powerful is located in the interval [0, 0.1] and the others, for
decreasing power levels, are located in intervals [−0.2, 0.1], [0.2, 0.3], [
−0.3,−0.2], respectively.
In Figure 27, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
In this case, the detected bandwidths for each threshold value are
overlapping, and only those corresponding to the highest threshold
value, A = 8, are clearly visible. It can be noticed that the detected
bandwidths are three, matching with those observable from the spec-
trogram. The most powerful single tone is detected inside the fre-
quency interval [0.02, 0.08], and the 2nd and 3rd in power single tone
are recognized in the frequency intervals [−0.15,−0.12] and [0.2, 0.23],
respectively. It is important to notice that only the lower power single
tone is not detected. This behavior can be explained by noticing that
its power does not cross over the considered lowest threshold value.
In Figure 28, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
In this case, the length of the shorter vector signal has been consid-
ered equal to 800 samples, corresponding to twice of that in the case
shown in Figure 27. It is worth to notice that with a greater signal
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Figure 26: Spectrogram - Urban Tones
Figure 27: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
length the detection of the interferer bandwidth gets better than in
the previous case. As a matter of facts, it is possible to define in a
more accurate way the bandwidths of all the considered single tones
and with respect to all the threshold values A = [2, 4, 8], and conse-
quently the detection errors decrease.
In Figure 29, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr16_tim
e3130_3330_B is shown. Through the spectrogram it can be observed
that the considered signal is a chirp waveform in the frequency inter-
val [−0.2, 0.45], with an uniform power.
In Figure 30, the comparison between the power spectral density of
the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown. In
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Figure 28: Comparison PSD with LSP = 800
Figure 29: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
this case, it must be taken into account that the signal is considered
inside the interval [−0.35, 0.35], which is twice the normalized band-
width. Then, it can be noticed that for the threshold value A = 8 the
algorithm accurately recognizes the interferer bandwidth, equal to
[−0.2, 0.35]. The detection for the threshold value A = 4 is quite sim-
ilar to the previous one with a small error in the lower bound of the
interfered interval. For the threshold value A = 2 the detection is not
reliable because the whole normalized bandwidth has been detected.
In Figure 31, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr18_tim
e2840_2860_B is shown. Through the spectrogram it is possible to ob-
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Figure 30: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
serve that the considered signal is a chirp waveform in the frequency
interval [−0.2, 0.45], with an uniform power.
Figure 31: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
In Figure 32, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
This case is similar to the previous one, and here it must be taken into
account that the signal is considered inside the interval [−0.35, 0.35]
as well, which is fixed at twice the normalized bandwidth. Thus, for
the threshold value A = 8 the algorithm accurately recognizes the
interferer bandwidth, which is the range [−0.2, 0.35]. The result for
the threshold value A = 4 is a slightly less accurate than the previous
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one. For the lowest threshold value A = 2 the detection is not reliable
because the whole normalized bandwidth has been detected.
Figure 32: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 33, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr20
_time0065_0085_B is shown. In this case, the spectrum is not clearly
visible: there are several interferer events in two frequency intervals in
the larger range [−0.3,−0.1]. Something else is present in the interval
[−0.1, 0.3]. However, it has a lower power than the others interferer
events.
Figure 33: Spectrogram - Urban Wideband
In Figure 34, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
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For the threshold value A = 8 the algorithm recognizes the inter-
ferer intervals [−0.31,−0.24], [−0.23,−0.12] and [−0.11, 0.16], excep-
tion made for the pick due to the noise. The detection is reliable even
if the interferer spectrogram is not clearly visible. For the threshold
values A = 4 and A = 2 the identified interferer bandwidths are quite
similar, and range from −0.32 to 0.28 and from −0.32 to 0.31, respec-
tively. In these cases the results of the algorithm are not reliable.
Figure 34: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 35, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr22
_time1560_1600_B is shown. The represented spectrum is not clear:
there are several interferer events distributed in the entire normalized
bandwidth.
In Figure 36, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
For all the threshold values, A = [2, 4, 8], the algorithm detects only
one interferer band, which becomes smaller by increasing the thresh-
old value. In this case, as the previous one, the detection is not reliable
due to the fact that the interferer behavior is not well defined.
In Figure 37, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr24_
time2140_2200_B is shown. Three principal interferer bands can be
observed, in which the interferer power is higher than in the other
frequencies belonging to the normalized bandwidth. These intervals
are [0.2, 0.3], [0, 0.1], [−0.25,−0.13].
In Figure 38, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
For the threshold value A = 8 the algorithm recognizes only two in-
terfered intervals [−0.31,−0.12], [−0.09, 0.34]. For the lower threshold
values A = 4 and A = 2 the algorithm results are not very accurate
because the identified bandwidths cover the entire normalized band-
width, thus not recognizing the interferer events.
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Figure 35: Spectrogram - Urban Wideband
Figure 36: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 39, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr29_tim
e1415_1455_B is shown. Three single tones are present, each with dif-
ferent power. The tones are in different frequency intervals: the most
powerful is located in the interval [−0.09, 0.1] and the others, in de-
creasing order of power, are located in intervals [0.15, 0.28], [−0.35,−0.29],
respectively.
In Figure 40, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
For the threshold value A = 8 the algorithm detect only two inter-
fered bands, the most powerful in the frequency interval [−0.09,−0.04]
and the second, in terms of power, in the interval [0.18, 0.2]. The single
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Figure 37: Spectrogram - Urban Wideband
Figure 38: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
tone with lowest power is not detected. For threshold values A = 2
and A = 4 the results are quite similar to each other and are actually
the same to which detected with the highest threshold value. Only
the results for A = 8 can be noticed due to overlapping. The differ-
ence is that with a lower threshold it is also possible to detect the
bandwidth of the lowest power single tone, which is recognized in
the frequency interval [−0.35,−0.32].
In Figure 41, the comparison between the power spectral density of
the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown. In
this case, the length of the shorter vector signal has been considered
equal to 800 samples, corresponding to twice of the case shown in
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Figure 39: Spectrogram - Urban Tones
Figure 40: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
Figure 40. It is worth to notice that with a greater signal length, the
detection of the interferer bandwidth gets better than in the previous
case. As a matter of facts, it is possible to define in a more accurate
way the bandwidths of all the considered single tones and with re-
spect to all the threshold values A = [2, 4, 8], and consequently the
error in the detection decreases.
In Figure 42, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr31
_time3260_3350_B is shown. The represented spectrum is not clear:
there are several interferer events distributed in all the normalized
bandwidth.
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Figure 41: Comparison PSD with LSP = 800
Figure 42: Spectrogram - Urban Wideband
In Figure 43, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
For threshold values A = [2, 4], the algorithm detects only one inter-
ferer band, which becomes smaller by increasing the threshold value.
For the threshold value A=8 there are two detected interfered bands
located in the intervals [−0.28,−0.23] and [−0.22, 0.22]. In this case, as
for the previous signals, the detection is not so reliable due to the fact
that the interferer behavior is not well defined.
In Figure 44, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr32_tim
e3120_3220_B is shown. Through the spectrogram it is possible to ob-
serve that the considered signal is a chirp waveform in the frequency
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Figure 43: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
interval [−0.35, 0.25], with an uniform power. Furthermore, a lower
interferer event is present in the frequencies closer to the end of the
normalized bandwidth.
Figure 44: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
In Figure 45, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
It is possible to notice that for the threshold value A = 8 the algo-
rithm accurately recognizes the interferer bandwidth in the interval
[−0.35, 0.25], while the lower interferer bandwidth is not recognized.
The detection for the threshold value A = 4 is quite similar to the pre-
vious one. Moreover, the detection of the lower interference events in
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the frequency interval [0.32, 0.34] is provided. For the threshold value
A = 2 the detection is not reliable because the whole normalized
bandwidth has been detected.
Figure 45: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 46, the spectrogram for the signals Urban_IF_Data_hr3
4_time0605_0625_B is shown. The interferer signal is a chirp signal
occupying the entire normalized bandwidth. It can also be noticed
that the interference presents a light lack of power, thus determining
three sub-bands in the intervals [−0.35,−0.1], [−0.09, 0.05] and [0 −
06, 0.25].
Figure 46: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
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In Figure 47, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
It is possible to notice that for the threshold value A = 8 the algo-
rithm recognizes, the interferer bandwidth in the three sub-intervals
[−0.28,−0.12], [−0.09, 0.03] and [0.06, 0.25], with limited errors. The
results for threshold values A = 4 and A = 2 are similar, and the de-
tection is not reliable because the entire normalized bandwidth has
been detected.
Figure 47: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 48, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr38
_time1850_1870_B is shown. The represented spectrum is not clear:
there are several interferer events distributed in all the normalized
bandwidth.
In Figure 49, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
For all the threshold values, A = [2, 4, 8], the algorithm detects only
one interferer band, which becomes smaller when increasing the thresh-
old value. In this case, as seen for previous signals, the detection is
not completely reliable due to the fact that the interferer behavior is
not well defined.
In Figure 50, the spectrogram of the signal Urban_IF_Data_hr3
8_time1900_1920_B is shown. It is possible to look at three single
tones, with different powers. The tones are in different frequency in-
tervals: the most powerful is collocated in the interval [−0.09, 0.02]
and the others, in decreasing order of power, are collocated in inter-
vals [0.1, 0.25], [−0.2,−0.3].
In Figure 51, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
For the threshold value A = 8 the algorithm detect only two inter-
fered bands, the most powerful in the frequency interval [−0.08,−0.04]
and the second, in terms of power, in the interval [0.14, 0.17]. The
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Figure 48: Spectrogram - Urban Wideband
Figure 49: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
single tone with lowest power is not detected. For threshold values
A = 2 and A = 4 the results are similar to each other, and are also the
same to the highest threshold value case. Only the results for A = 8
can be noticed, because there is overlapping. The difference is that
with lower thresholds it is also possible to detect the bandwidth of
the lowest power single tone, which is recognized in the frequency
interval [−0.35,−0.26] with a larger band than that defined in the
spectrogram.
In Figure 52, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
As in the previous cases, the length of the shorter vector signal has
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Figure 50: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
Figure 51: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
been considered equal to 800 samples, corresponding to twice of the
case shown Figure 51. Also in this case, it is possible to notice that the
detection of the interfered bandwidths gets better than the previous
case. As a consequence, it is possible to define in a more accurate way
the bandwidths of all the considered single tones and with respect to
all the threshold values A = [2, 4, 8], with smaller errors. In order to
explicitly show the improvement on narrowband peak identification
thanks to longer observation spans, detection performance has been
tested with LSP as a parameter, and results are shown in Figure 53.
The considered signal is the Urban_IF_Data_hr38_time1900_1920_
B and the threshold value A has been set equal to 4. In this case the
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Figure 52: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
representation of graph lines is inverted with respect to the previ-
ous figures, so that it is possible to distinguish in a better way the
lines representing the received signal with different lengths LSP. It is
worth to notice that increasing the parameter LSP a more accurate es-
timation of the interfered bandwidths is evaluated. As shown in the
figure, the bandwidth estimation with LSP equal to 800 (red line with
star marker) is closer to the real interferer bandwidths than those
evaluated for LSP equal to 400 (black line with square marker) and
200 (green line with asterisk marker). The detection performed with
LSP = 800 is accurate for the all interferer events. On the contrary, the
detections evaluated with LSP = 400 and LSP = 200 are less precise,
defining larger bandwidths than the real ones, in particular for the
less powerful tone.
In Figure 54, the spectrogram for the signals Urban_IF_Data_hr41_ti
me2160_2190_B is shown. The interferer signal is a chirp signal which
occupies all the normalized bandwidth [−0.3, 0.3].
In Figure 55, the comparison between the power spectral density of
the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown. It
is possible to notice that for all the threshold values A = [2, 4, 8] the
algorithm recognizes the whole normalized bandwidth.
In Figure 56, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
As in the previous cases, the length of the shorter vector signal has
been considered equal to 800 samples, corresponding to twice of the
case show Figure 55. In this case, it is possible to notice that the de-
tection of the interfered bandwidths is not particularly different to
the case with 400 samples. Thus, it can be deduced that increasing
the parameter LSP does not affect the detection accuracy of the inter-
fered bandwidths unlike single tones detection, as verified in Figure
28, Figure 41, Figure 52.
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Figure 53: Detection Test with A = 4 and LSP = [200, 400, 800]
Figure 54: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
In Figure 57, the spectrogram for the signals Urban_IF_Data_hr4
2_time1810_1830_B is shown. The interferer signal is uniformly dis-
tributed in the entire normalized bandwidth [−0.3, 0.3], except for the
interval [0, 0.09] which seems to be a single tone.
In Figure 58, the comparison between the power spectral density of
the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown. It
is possible to notice that for the threshold value A = 8 the detection is
not much accurate because the identified interferer bandwidth ranges
from −0.22 to 0.21. The performance gets worse with threshold values
A = 4 andA = 2 because the recognized interferer band is quite equal
to the normalized bandwidth.
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Figure 55: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
Figure 56: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
In Figure 59, the spectrogram for the signals Urban_IF_Data_hr51_
time2880_2900_B is shown. The interferer signal is not clearly visible
and it presents high power values in the frequency interval [0, 0.3]
and a lower power in the interval [−0.3, 0].
In Figure 60, the comparison between the power spectral density
of the signal and the results of the Burst Detector algorithm is shown.
It is possible to notice that for threshold value A = 8 the detection is
not more accurate than that for threshold values A = 4 and A = 2,
but the detected bandwidth is quite similar in all the cases, without
recognizing the most powerful interference bandwidth.
Finally, it can be stated that the Bandwidth Detection algorithm
works properly in all the analyzed cases and that it can be efficiently
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Figure 57: Spectrogram - Urban Wideband
Figure 58: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
adopted to recognize the interfered bands inside the received signal
spectrum. It is worthwhile noticing that the power threshold A signif-
icantly affects the performance of the algorithm: low thresholds often
lead to better results for narrowband signals, but they are less accu-
rate in case of wide bandwidth interferers. In general, the mean value
A = 4 seems to constitute a valid trade-off, and it is recommended
for future implementation purposes.
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Figure 59: Spectrogram - Urban Chirp
Figure 60: Comparison PSD with LSP = 400
1.6 conclusions
For the Bandwidth Detection algorithm an update has been provided
in order to account for the front-end bandwidth limitation effects and
for the sampling rate, which could excessively increase the computa-
tional complexity: by observing the spectrograms of the real interferer
signals, it has been possible to verify that all the signals occupy 70% of
the Front-End bandwidth, thus, only the most significant part of the
spectrum [−BN,BN], must be considered. Then, a down-sampling of
the received signal is performed, obtaining a new shorter signal vec-
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tor with a signal length equal to the desired LSP, which allows the
WT to be evaluated with a smaller complexity. The Band Detection al-
gorithm has been tested with measured signals, collected in an urban
scenario. Performance is evaluated through graphical results because
prior knowledge on the interferer nature is lacking. It is possible to
verify the correct behavior of the proposed algorithm comparing its
result to the spectrogram. It is worth highlighting that the correct
detection of the interferer bands strictly depends on two principal pa-
rameters: the threshold A and the length LSP, which is the length of
the observed signal after down-sampling. As shown in the numerical
results, increasing the threshold value A leads to more accurate esti-
mation of interfered bandwidths. Furthermore, for narrowband inter-
ference, the algorithm sensitivity on LSP is stronger than that on the
threshold A, and increasing this parameter significantly affects per-
formance. This is due to the fact that the number of scale factors Ns
depends on LSP, and in particular the duration of the Haar wavelet
function is inversely proportional to the square root of the maximum
scale factor amax, while the amplitude is proportional to its square
root. In particular increasing LSP leads to the following effects: amax
becomes larger; ii) the Haar function becomes more peaked; and iii)
the scalar product inside the WT accordingly becomes more signifi-
cant for peaked signals, allowing correct identification of frequency
location of narrowband tones. Therefore, it is possible to state that in-
creasing LSP leads to the correct identification of frequency location
of narrowband tones, with less errors in the estimation of interfered
bandwidths.
The described WT based algorithm has been also applied in the time-
domain in order to characterize the signal duty-cycle, i. e.the time
interval in which the jamming signal is active or not. The main dif-
ference with respect to the previously presented application consists
in the evaluation of the power envelope of the signal (instead of the
PSD) and in this case the time characteristics must be obtained. The
algorithm provides information on both the burst localization and on
the duty-cycle values. Numerical results have shown that a good es-
timation of the signal duty cycle can be obtained, with an increasing
reliability for shorter duty cycle values.
2
G N S S J A M M E R I N M U LT I PAT H S C E N A R I O
2.1 introduction
As explained previously in Chapter 1, the aim of GNSS jammers is to
deny the correct reception of navigation signals, and as such they rep-
resent one of the dominant threats to GNSS services and in particular
of their availability. There is a clear necessity for techniques and al-
gorithms to enhance the robustness to jammers in GNSS receivers, the
best option being the ability to isolate and cancel out the interfering
signal. Considering land mobile GNSS applications, usually the jam-
mer will be located on the earth surface and direct visibility to the tar-
get will only be sporadic, inasmuch as propagation will be enriched
by multiple reflection, diffraction, and absorption effects. Therefore,
the interfering signal will typically reach the GNSS antenna through a
multipath channel, possibly without a line-of-sight, and the receiver
will be faced with a number of malicious echoes generated by the
channel power delay profile, which render interference cancellation a
phenomenal task. In this chapter, starting from the Interference Char-
acterization and Cancellation (ICC) algorithm proposed in [P4][Pr1]
and exhaustively described in [28], we present a solution to the prob-
lem of cancelling GNSS jammer signals affected by multipath which is
both effective and computationally efficient. Specifically, we refer to
interfering attacks by means of personal devices, as evidenced in sev-
eral measurement campaigns [30][48][12], which present a periodic
and structured autocorrelation function. In the absence of multipath,
this structure is static and can be exploited to estimate an effective
interference reference period upon which the ICC algorithm can be
applied. This is all very well, but assuming a non-frequency selec-
tive channel is rather optimistic, as we clarified above. Moving from
these results, the extension to the multipath scenario can be an in-
teresting case. Exploring the literature on multipath effects on GNSS
receivers, it is immediate to observe that, while it is recognized that
multipath is a critical issue in the development of high-performance
GNSS applications and reducing its adverse effects is a priority, the
attention has been focused almost entirely on the consequent im-
pact on desired GNSS signals and/or on PVT calculation[84][1][64][3].
Extremely rare are those who considered the fragmentation of in-
terference due to dispersed power delay profiles; in [2] space-time
adaptive processing techniques are used to mitigate the presence of
GNSS interference in a multipath environment. It could appear that
the solution might entail a simple replication in parallel of the ICC
algorithm into a sufficient number of branches to match the popula-
tion of significant multipath components. This is one case where sim-
plicity of ideation is opposed to simplicity of implementation. The
main idea of this approach comes from recognizing that propaga-
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tion through a time-dispersive channel will not destroy, but rather
transform, the auto-correlation structure of a waveform. Certainly, the
transformation will be dynamic, with characteristic time-constants
that depend on the trajectory of both the jammer and its target re-
ceiver. However, it will always be possible to limit the observation
window to time intervals characterized by the fact that the interfer-
ence auto-correlation structure is quasi-static: here, estimation of an
effective echoed-interference reference period is again possible, using
approaches which are completely similar to the purely static case,
without any resort to parallelization. Moving along these lines of
thought, we have extended the already proposed ICC [P4] algorithm
into an Echoed-Interference Characterization and Cancellation (EICC) ver-
sion. The attention is mainly focused on the interfering signal affected
by multipath propagation neglecting the useful GNSS signal.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 the system model
is presented; in Section 2.3 the algorithm is described, highlightening
its principal operations and functionalities and complexity evaluation;
in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 the applications in LOS and Multipath scenarios
are presented, both validated by numerical results. Finally, conclud-
ing remarks are reported in Section 2.6.
2.2 system model
Measurement campaigns described in literature have shown that the
most common GNSS jamming signals are angle modulated carriers
[48]. These interferers contain a core with a periodic behaviour,i.e.
they have a waveform that repeat itself periodically in time. Thus,
current interfering signals can be expressed as:
s
FM
(t) = A exp
{
j2pi
(
f0t+
∫t
−∞ z(ξ)dξ
)}
(12)
s
PM
(t) = A exp {j2pi (f0t+ z(t))} (13)
which correspond to FM and PM, respectively. For a generic and peri-
odic modulation function
z(t) =
∑
k
z0(t− kT) (14)
and consequently the previous equations can be rewritten as:
s
FM
(t) =
∑
k
Aks¯FM(t− kT)e
ΘFM(k) (15)
s
PM
(t) =
∑
k
Aks¯PM(t− kT)e
ΘPM(k) (16)
These models represent different types of interfering signals includ-
ing chirp, single tone and frequency hopping signals. The periodical
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envelope due to the periodicity of the modulation function z(t) con-
firms that these kind of interfering signals have a characteristic wave-
form that repeats in time. Consequently, detection, estimation and
mitigation techniques of the signal waveform can be defined by ex-
ploiting this property. The analytical interfering baseband signal is:
s(t) =
∞∑
k=−∞Aks0 (t− kT) e
jθk (17)
where s0 (t− kT) is the signal periodic core, Ak and θk are the sig-
nal amplitude and phase of each period, respectively.
Finally the received signal is:
r(t) = s(t) +w(t) (18)
where w(t) is the AWGN with zero-mean and variance equal to N0
(∼ N(0,N0)).
In this work GNSS signal is neglected in order to focus the attention
on the jamming signal.
2.3 algorithm description
In the previous section the most common interfering signals have
been introduced. Their mathematical expressions have been shown
pointing out their periodic envelope in time, which can be exploited
for the design of techniques able to counteract the jamming signals. In
this work we present a different algorithm which exploits these peri-
odic characteristics in jamming waveforms, and above all AC function
properties, in order to detect, to estimate and to mitigate interfering
events. The algorithm has been already presented and described in
[P4] and [28]:
• Interferer Detection
• Interferer Waveform Acquisition
• Interferer Waveform Estimation
• Interferer Mitigation
In the following the time-discrete version of the received signal in
eq.(18) is considered, expressed as:
r(n) = s(n) +w(n) =
+∞∑
k=−∞Aks0(nTs− kT)e
jΦk +w(n) (19)
where Ts is the sampling period and w(n) are the noise sample
of the time-continue noise process w(t), which are distributed as in-
dipendent Gaussian random variables.
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2.3.1 Interferer Detection
The Detection consists in observing the received signal in order to
find any interfering event that may occour. The detection procedure
is based on the AC function of the received signal. If a structured inter-
fering signal is present, the AC function presents several peaks in the
considered time window. These peaks correspond to the repetition
period T . Thus, it is possible to design a simple way in jamming de-
tection by exploiting this periodic characteristic. Detection procedure
presents three steps:
1. The AC function is evaluated according to the Wiener-Kintchine
theorem by means of the Fourier Transform (FT) and then nor-
malized in order to have unit power (at zero-lag).
2. The detection test variable is evaluated as the maximum asbso-
lute value of the AC function neglecting the zero-lag sample in
order to find the next maximum value.
3. The test is compared against a set threshold ξ.
It is worthwhile to notice that due to the finite observation time, the
AC function can be estimated, thus no true value can be carried out.
The procedure is described also in Algorithm 4 and shown in Figure
(61).
Interference Detection Algorithm
1) Rrr∗(m) = F−1
{
F {r(n)} ·F {r(n)}∗} ;
Rrr(m) =
Rrr∗(m)
Rrr∗(0)
;
2) Test = max |Rrr∗(m)| m 6= 0 ;
3) Test ≷ ξ ;
Algorithmus 4 : Interference Detection Algorithm
Figure 61: Interferer Detection - Block Diagram.
In the first step the circular correlation is performed by the Dis-
crete Fourier Transform (DFT) where F {} and F−1 {} are the DFT and
the inverse DFT, respectively. These operations can be calculated by
the efficient numerical tools FFT and Inverse FFT (IFFT) for a large val-
ues of N, which is the signal samples in the observation windows.
The AC function Rrr∗(m) is defined for m ∈ [Mmin,Mmax], i. e.for
a limited number of lags. This interval has to be defined in order to
be able to detect all the possible structured interferers, which could
have different periods. Thus, it is necessary to properly define these
parameters with the aim of detecting different jamming signal with
different repetition period T .
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2.3.1.1 Statistical Parameter Setting
Taking into account the Algorithm 4, it is necessary to set the lag-
interval in which the AC function has to be evaluated. In [12] and
[48] the measurement campaigns have highlightened that jamming
signals have repetition periods varying usually from 1µs to 50µs with
some longer exceptions (∼ 70µs). As stated before, the number of
lags has to be larger enough in order to detect at least one repetition
period, and so we have:
MmaxTs > T (20)
The detection problem is defined as a binary decision problem,
with two hypotheses:
• H1 : the Test is greater than the threshold. The jammer is de-
tected and the AC function peaks are located at each repetition
period instant
• H0 : the Test is lower than the threshold, meaning that any peak
is present.
The AC function at the step 1 of the algorithm is defined by means
of the product of FT transforms and it can be assumed as the results
of average sum of products of the received signal samples, which
are considered statistically indipendent each others. Neglecting the
energy at the zero-lag (m 6= 0), at each repetition period the cor-
responding AC peak has energy equal to the average signal energy.
The received signal r(n) expressed in eq.(19) can be statistically ex-
pressed as a Gaussian random variable with mean equal to µr = A
and variance σ2r = N0, due to the deterministic nature of s(n) and
w(n) ∼ N(0,N0). Considering that the evaluation of the mean and
variance of a random variable defined as the product of two indipen-
dent variables (a and b) are, respectively:
E[ab] = E[a]E[b] (21)
Var(ab) = E2[a]Var(b) + E2[b]Var(a) +Var(a)Var(b)
it is possible to define the statistical values of the single signal prod-
uct as:
µrr∗ = A
2 (22)
σ2rr∗ = σ
2
r
(
2µrr + σ
2
r
)
(23)
where the amplitude A is considered constant in each time period
repetition. Consequently it is possible to define the statistical proper-
ties of the AC function, which can be expressed as:
52 gnss jammer in multipath scenario
µR =
A2
A2 + σ2r
=
A2
σ2r
1+ A
2
σ2r
(24)
σ2R =
1
M
σrr∗
(A2 + σ2r)
2
=
1
M
1+ 2A
2
σ2r(
1+ A
2
σ2r
)2 (25)
due to the Jammer-to-Noise Ratio (JNR) A
2
σ2r
and lags (M) normaliza-
tion. Once statistical values of the AC have been defined, it is possible
to evaluate the power value at the peak of the AC function as:
JNRAC =
µ2R
σ2R
(26)
= M
A4
σ4r(
1+ A
2
σ2r
)2
= M
JNR2
1+ 2JNR
At the same way, it is necessary to evaluate statistical properties
for the hypothesis H0, i. e.when the interfering signal is not present.
Thus, it is possible to express with the same procedure as above the
mean and variance values of the product of received signal samples:
µrr∗ = 0 (27)
σrr∗ = σ
4
r (28)
and the corresponding statistical properties for AC function under
H0 are:
µR = 0 (29)
σR =
1
M
(30)
JNRAC = 0 (31)
2.3.1.2 Detector Design
As previously stated, the detection of the interfering signal is mod-
eled as a binary decision problem with two hypotheses H1 the in-
terfering signal is present, H0 the interfering signal is absent. The
decision test has been defined as the maximum of the absolute value
of the AC function of the received signal, as described at the step 2 of
the algorithm 4. The AC function has been evaluated by averaging a
large number of products between random variables, thus it is possi-
ble to define the AC function Gaussian distributed random variable.
2.3 algorithm description 53
The considered variable is the AC function of the received signal, and
the binary decision problem can be expressed as:
Rrr∗(τ) = Rss(τ) + Rw(τ) : H1
Rrr∗(τ) = Rw(τ) : H0
(32)
where under H1 the AC function is defined as the sum of the AC
functions of the transmitted signal s and the noise w, instead under
H0 it is defined by the noise AC function. Assumed that the AC func-
tion is a Gaussian process, the probabilities density functions of the
observable R under hypotheses can be written as following:
pR¯|H1
(
R¯|H1
)
=
 1√
2piσ2R
N exp{− 1
2σ2R
∥∥R¯− λ¯∗(τ,∆f)ejθ∥∥2} (33)
pR¯|H0
(
R¯|H0
)
=
 1√
2piσ2R
N exp{− 1
2σ2R
∥∥R¯∥∥2} (34)
The function λ(τ,∆f) represents the local replica of the AC function,
and the derived expression represents the design of a generic decision
binary problem including also the possibility of knowing the received
signal waveform. The parameter τ represent the time instant in which
the AC function is evaluated; ∆f is the signal bandwidth and θ is the
phase of the AC function. The likelihood ratio is:
` (τ,∆f, θ) =
p
(
R¯|H1, τ,∆f, θ
)
p
(
R¯|H0
) (35)
=
exp
{
− 1
2σ2R
∥∥R¯− λ¯∗(τ,∆f)ejθ∥∥2}
exp
{
− 1
2σ2R
∥∥R¯∥∥2}
= exp
{
−
1
2σ2R
∥∥λ¯∗(τ,∆f)ejθ∥∥2} · exp{ 1
σ2R
<
{
R¯ · λ¯∗ (τ,∆f) ejθ}}
The AC phase θ is unknown thus it is assumed uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, 2pi] with a pdf equal to
p(θ) =
1
2pi
Taking into account the unknown phase, it is possible to neglect this
value evaluating a mean function with respect to θ of the likelihood
ratio, obtaining
`(τ,∆f) =
∫pi
−pi
`(τ,∆f, θ)p(θ)dθ (36)
= exp
{
−
‖λ∗(τ,∆f)‖2
2σ2R
}
· I0
(∣∣R¯ · λ¯∗(τ,∆f)∣∣
σ2R
)
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where I0(·) is the modified zero-order Bessel function of the first
kind. Calculating the natural logarithm of the average likelihood ratio,
we have:
Λ(τ,∆f) = ln `(τ,∆f) = −
‖λ∗(τ,∆f)‖2
2σ2R
+ ln I0
(∣∣R¯ · λ¯∗(τ,∆f)∣∣
σ2R
)
(37)
Taking into account the monotone envelope of the I0(·) it is possible
to consider only its argument thus the average log-likelihood ratio
test (ALLRT) becomes:
Λ(τ,∆f) ' ln
∣∣R¯ · λ¯∗(τ,∆f)∣∣
σ2R
Hˆ1
>
<
Hˆ0
ξ (38)
where the energy term, represented by the first addend in eq.(37), is
not considered. The likelihood test expressed in eq.(38) depends on
the time-shift τ and signal bandwidth ∆f and it is difficult to compute
without any theoretical assumption.
2.3.2 Interferer Waveform Acquisition
Once the jamming signal has been detected, the successive step is to
acquire the malicious signal. This is necessary in order to mitigate
and remove the interfering signal. The acquisition of the interferer
waveform consists in estimating the repetition period T = mTs of the
structured signal and in storing part of the received signal, of dura-
tion equal to the estimated repetition period. As stated before, it is
possible to estimate the period by exploiting AC function properties
of these kinds of signals, AC function that has to be calculated in a dis-
crete set of lags which satisfies the condition MlagTs > T . Thus, the
period estimation is carried out calculating the maximum absolute
value of the AC function Rrr∗(m) and selecting the lag m at which
the evaluated maximum absolute value corresponds. Then, the local
replica I of the jamming signal can be stored selecting part of the
received signal of duration equal to the estimated repetition period.
The procedure is reported in algorithm 5 and shown in Figure (62).
Interferer Waveform Acquisition
1) Rrr∗(m) = F−1
{
F {r(n)} ·F {r(n+m)}∗} ;
Rrr(m) =
Rrr∗(m)
Rrr∗(0)
;
2) mˆ = maxm |Rrr∗(m)| m 6= 0;
3) I = [r(1), ..., r(mˆ)] ;
Algorithmus 5 : Interferer Waveform Acquisition
2.3.3 Interferer Waveform Estimation
Once the local replica I has been derived, it can be used to track and
to estimate the malicious waveform. The estimation is carried out
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Figure 62: Interferer Acquisition - Block Diagram.
according to the Maximum Likelihood (ML) criterion, applied at each
part of signal long as the estimated period Tˆ = mˆTs. Then, parameters
phase φ and amplitude A are estimated at each period. This step is
performed defining ND delayed version of the received signal, which
are very Early, Early, Prompt, Late, very Late with one sample of time-
spacing between each other. According to the ML criterion the phase
and amplitude parameter estimations are defined as:
φi = angle {ri • I} (39)
Ai =
<{ri • I}
I • I (40)
where i ∈ [vE,E,P,L, vL], a • b represents the scalar product be-
tween a and b. The Thus, the estimates of amplitude and phase pa-
rameters are defined as the real part of the scalar product between the
received signal delayed version and the local replica and normalized
by the local replica energy, and angle of the scalar product between
considered version of the received signal and the local replica, respec-
tively. Successively, the likelihood function Λ is maximized and the
delay, phase and amplitude estimates are carried out. When these pa-
rameters are defined at each period the interfering signal s can be
estimated and it can be expressed as:
sˆ = AˆIejφˆ (41)
Taking into account that the Prompt replica begins at time-sample
D = mˆ, the other replicas correspond to [−2,−1,+1,+2] with respect
to the Prompt one. The procedure, for each period, is described in
algorithm 6 and shown in Figure (63).
The delayed version, which maximizes the scalar product with the
local replica, updates the local replica. The new local replica I, which
will be used for the next signal period, is updated by evaluating the
mean of the replicas, stored in a matrix of L rows.
In order to reconstruct the jamming waveform, a more accurate es-
timation of the parameters has to be performed. It is necessary to
refine the estimated values starting from the initial coarse estimation
through the ML criterion.
2.3.4 Interferer Waveform Mitigation
The last step of our algorithm is the cancellation of the interfering
signal. Since that the interfering waveform has been estimated in the
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Interferer Waveform Estimation
while 1 do
for i = vE : vL;
1) ri = [i+D, . . . , mˆ+ i] ;
2) φi = angle {ri • I};
φ = [φ,φi] ;
3) Λi = <
{
(ri • I) e−jφi
}
;
Λ = [Λ,Λi] ;
end ;
4) (D,φ) = [D+ i,φi] if max(Λ) = Λi ;
5) r = ri if max(Λ) = Λi ;
6) A = <{r•I}I•I ;
7) I = mean (r, I,L) ;
end
Algorithmus 6 : Interferer Waveform Estimation
previous step, the cancellation steps consists in subtracting the esti-
mated interfering waveform in eq.(41) from the received signal, as:
rˆ = r− sˆ (42)
Once the interfering signal is cancelled, and consequently the jam-
ming effect is mitigated, it is possible to increase the reliability and
the effectiveness of the GNSS signal transmission. Thus, the elabora-
tion and calculation of the PVT solutions are computationally easier
to be done.
In this section, we have shown our approach in interference detec-
tion and mitigation problem. The theoretical aspects of the algorithm
have been described detailing the principal operations. The described
algorithm has been also tested in two different scenarios, Non Disper-
sive Channel and Multipath Channel. The theoretical approach of both
scenarios is described in section 2.4 and in section 2.5, respectively.
2.3.5 Complexity Evaluation
In the following, the complexity evaluation for the proposed algo-
rithm is defined. As described before the algorithm is defined by
four steps and for each of them a complexity evaluation has to be
estimated. It is worthwhile to notice that all this analysis on the algo-
rithm complexity hase been already described in [28] and [29], except
for the detection step.
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Figure 63: Interferer Estimation - Flow graph.
2.3.5.1 ID & IWA
In both detection and waveform acquisition the most complex op-
eration is the evaluation of the AC function by exploiting the FFT
and the IFFT. As well known, the complexity of one FFT operation
is O
(
N log2N
)
.
2.3.5.2 IWE
The interferer waveform estimation step is the most complex of the
proposed algorithm. The complexity is evaluated in terms of number
of operations to be performed at each signal period repetition.
1. For each delayed signal replica, phase estimation is performed.
This task is evaluated by the correlationbetween two sequence
of length mˆ. Thus, this calculation requires: mˆND products,
mˆND sums and ND angle functions
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2. Likelihood function Λ: delayed replicas are de-rotated by prod-
ucts with the conjugate phase. evaluated before. Thus, ND com-
plex products are implemented.
3. Amplitude estimation is performed as a the real part of the cor-
relation between the delayed version which satisfies the maxi-
mum Λ and the normalization by the local replica energy. Thus,
only two products are implemented.
4. Updating of the Local replica I: the last step is to update the
local replica. It is necessary to average L sequences of length mˆ,
requiring mˆL sums and L products.
2.3.5.3 IWM
The last step is the cancellation of the estimated jamming signal. This
part consists in the difference between the received signal and the
reconstructed interfering waveform. Thus, a simple difference is per-
formed.
Finally, the total computational complexity of the algorithm can
be estimated. The proposed procedure needs a number of sums and
products equal to:
Nsums = mˆ (ND + 1+ L) (43)
Nprod = mˆ (ND + 1+ 1) (44)
which highlight that the complexity is proportional to the lag mˆ,
which defines the estimated repetition period.
2.4 non-dispersive channel
Due to the increasing widespread of GNSS applications in human life
activities, it is necessary to define techniques able to counteract the
malicious events that wants to deny the correct operation of the GNSS
receiver. As explained previously, the jamming threat in GNSS system
is a very hot topic and several research studies have been done. Most
of these results regard to detection and mitigation of the interfering
event in a non dispersive channel scenario. The jammer is in earth
surface and direct visibility to the target, thus the received signal is
defined as the jamming signal embedded in noise process, assumed
to be a additive gaussian statistical process. In [29] an algorithm able
to cope with all the interfering signals with a structured envelope, is
proposed. As extensively described in [28], the algorithm consists of
four stages: i) waveform acquisition, ii) waveform tracking, iii) effec-
tive interference parameter estimation, iv) interference cancellation.
The performance is evaluated in terms of residual of cancellation and
it has been carried out for three different types of signal, continuous
waveform, chirp and CDMA.
2.4 non-dispersive channel 59
2.4.1 Jamming Chirp
In our study we consider a jamming chirp signal. Chirp signals are
defined as FM signals in which the frequency increases or decreases
with time, called "up-chirp" and "down-chirp", respectively. They are
also called as sweep signals. The modulation function can be classi-
fied in two main categories, linear chirp modulation and exponential
chirp modulation, i. e.the swept in frequency is defined by a linear
function or an exponential one, respectively. In the following, a chirp
signal with a frequency varying linearly in time is considered. The
jamming signal is expressed as:
s(t) = ArectT (t) cos
(
2pi
∫t
0
f(r)dr
)
=
= ArectT (t) cos
(
2pi
∫t
0
[
f0 ± ρ
2pi
r
]
dr
)
= ArectT (t) cos
(
2pif0t± ρt
2
2
)
(45)
where ρ = 2pi∆fT is the frequency variation rate, T is the pulse pe-
riod, f0 is the carrier frequency and ∆f is the frequency excursion
during a pulse period.
Taking into account eq.(17) and considering one signal period, the
jamming basic waveform is:
s0(t) = exp
{
±jρt
2
2
}
rect
(
t
T
)
(46)
In the following, an "up-chirp", with a positive frequency slope, is
considered.
2.4.2 Jamming Chirp Autocorrelation Analysis
As highlighted in the previous section, the most common jamming
signals are structured and present a periodic envelope. Among them,
one of the interesting case-study is represented by the chirp signal,
which expression is shown in eq.(46). In order to exploit this periodic
characteristics, a complete analysis of the AC function is carried out.
The spectrum of the chirp signal is evaluated through the FT of the
signal which is expressed as:
S(f) =
∫+∞
−∞ s(t)e−j2piftdt (47)
=
∫T/2
−T/2
ej
ρ
2 t
2
e−j2piftdt
=
∫T/2
−T/2
ej(
ρ
2 t
2−2pift)dt
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The argument of the exponential function can be considered as the
square of a difference without the square of the second term. Thus,
we have:
ρ
2
t2 − 2pift = (a− b)2 − b2 (48)
= a2 − 2ab
From eq.(48) it is possible to define a =
√
ρ
2 t and b = pif
√
2
ρ and
so the exponent in eq.(47) can be written as:
ρ
2
t2 − 2pift =
(√
ρ
2
t− pif
√
2
ρ
)2
−
2
ρ
(pif)2 (49)
Thus, the chirp spectrum expression is:
S(f) = e−j
2(pif)2
ρ
∫T/2
−T/2
e
j
(√
ρ
2 t−pif
√
2
ρ
)2
dt (50)
=
√
pi
ρ
e−j
2(pif)2
ρ
∫Z2
Z1
ejpi
y2
2 dy
The last expression is obtained through the substitution√
ρ
2
t− pif
√
2
ρ
=
√
pi
2
y
and the derivation of the corresponding integration interval
Z1 =
√
ρ
pi
T
(
−
1
2
−
f
∆f
)
=
√
2∆fT
(
−
1
2
−
f
∆f
)
=
√
2∆fT
(
−∆f− 2f
2∆f
)
(51)
Z2 =
√
ρ
pi
T
(
1
2
−
f
∆f
)
=
√
2∆fT
(
1
2
−
f
∆f
)
=
√
2∆fT
(
∆f− 2f
2∆f
)
(52)
The last expression of the chirp spectrum can be considered as
a linear combination of Fresnel integral functions. It is possible to
notice that the expression of eq.(50) is the Fresnel integral E(x) =
C(x) + jS(x), where
C(x) =
∫x
0
cos
(
piy2
2
)
dy
S(x) =
∫x
0
sin
(
piy2
2
)
dy
Finally, the chirp spectrum can be expressed as:
S(f) =
√
pi
ρ
e−j
2(pif)2
ρ {C(Z2) +C(−Z1) + j [S(Z2) + S(−Z1)]}
=
√
pi
ρ
e−j
2(pif)2
ρ {E(Z2) + E(−Z1)} (53)
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where the properties C(−x) = −C(x) and S(−x) = −S(x) are con-
sidered.
The amplitude spectrum is defined as:
|S(f)| =
√
pi
ρ
{[C(Z2) +C(Z1)]2 + [S(Z2) + S(Z1)]2} (54)
and the phase spectrum is:
Φ(f) =
(2pif)2
2ρ
+ tan−1
{
−
S(Z2) + S(Z1)
C(Z2) +C(Z1)
}
(55)
where the first term is a quadratic contribution and the second
term is the phase shift due to Fresnel integrals. Taking into account
that Fresnel integrals are complex functions, it is possible to derive
an approximation of the eq.(53) studying the asymptotic behaviour
of the Fresnel integrals:
C(x)x→±∞ = ±1
2
(56)
S(x)x→±∞ = ±1
2
(57)
Let us consider an interfering signal with large period T . According
to eq. (56) and (57), Fresnel Integral becomes:
E(Z2) = C(Z2)± jS(Z2) = ±1
2
± j1
2
(58)
E(Z1) = C(Z1)± jS(Z1) = ±1
2
± j1
2
(59)
where Z1 and Z2 depend on frequency, thus it is necessary to de-
fine the Fresnel equation behavior with varying frequency f. Let us
consider −Z1 and Z2 one at a time, always taking into account a
large interfering period T . According to eq.(51), when 2f < 0 and
|2f| > ∆f, −Z1 tends to −∞ thus E(−Z1)→ −12 − j12 ; otherwise, −Z1
tends to +∞ thus E(−Z1) → +12 + j12 . Similarly, according to eq.(52)
when |2f| > ∆f then Z2 tends to −∞ thus E(Z2) → −12 − j12 ; other-
wise Z2 tends to +∞ thus E(Z2) → +12 + j12 . Through these studies
and concerning eq.(53), it is possible to derive an approximation of
chirp spectrum defined by the sum of Fresnel integral E(Z2)+E(−Z1).
Chirp spectrum can be considered as a rectangular function within
the bandwidth ∆f, obtaining
S(f)→ (1+ j)rect
{
f
∆f
}
In Figure(64) Fresnel integral approximations are shown: in (a), (b),
(c), E(Z2), E(−Z1) and E(Z2)+E(−Z1) asymptotic behaviors are shown,
respectively.
Tanking into account the previous approximation regarding Fres-
nel integral, chirp spectrum can be expressed as:
S(f) '
√
pi
ρ
e−j
2(pif)2
ρ [1+ j] rect
(
f
∆f
)
(60)
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Figure 64: Fresnel integral approximation.
It is well known that the autocorrelation function of a signal is the
inverse Fourier transform of its Energy Spectral Density (ESD). In this
case, the chirp ESD is:
Ess(f) = |S(f)|
2 = 2
pi
ρ
rect
(
f
∆f
)
(61)
and, according to the Wiener-Khintchine Theorem, the autocorrela-
tion function of the chirp signal can be expressed:
Rss(t) = F
−1 {Ess(f)} = 2
pi
ρ
∆fsinc (∆ft) = Tsinc (∆ft) (62)
Taking into account the eq.(18), AC function of the received signal
is written as:
Rrr(t) = Rss(t) + RW(t) (63)
in which the RN(t) represents the AC function of the noise process,
considered independent from the jamming signal.
2.4.3 Numerical Results
2.4.3.1 Approximation Validation
The parameter used is this validation are:
• Interferer bandwidth: 500[KHz],1[MHz],2[MHz]. These values
are derived by the ratio between the sampling frequency fs =
20[MHz] and the maximum frequency of the chirp signal. So
that Fs2Fmax = [40, 20, 10] correspond to 500[KHz],1[MHz],2[MHz],
respectively.
• Interferer period: 25, 50, 70[µs]
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• Observed signal length equal to three periods.
In eq.(62) an approximation of the autocorrelation function of the
chirp signal is expressed. In order to validate this approximation, a
comparison between the AC function in eq.(62) has been done.
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Figure 65: (a)Approximation accuracy vs. interfering signal bandwidth; (b)
approximation accuracy vs. interfering signal period.
In figures 2.65(a) and 2.65(b) the results of the accuracy of this ap-
proximation are shown, varying interfering signal bandwidth and in-
terfering signal period, respectively.
It is possible to notice that the approximation in eq.(62) almost
matches the AC function expressed in the algorithm 4 in both cases.
Thus, it is possible to consider valid the approximation of the chirp
AC function carried out in the section 2.4.2.
64 gnss jammer in multipath scenario
2.4.3.2 ID: Probability of Detection
In section 2.3.1.2 the theoretical analysis of the binary decision prob-
lem has been derived. The detection test has been defined exploiting
the ML criterion. As stated before, the likelihood ratio in eq.(38) de-
pends on the time-shift τ and the bandwidth ∆f and it is not simple to
compute without any assumption. Thus it is possible to distinguish
two different approaches:
• Classic Detector: λ¯(τ) = λ¯(τ,∆f) |∆f→∞. In this case the auto-
correlation replica becomes a Dirac delta and so the product∣∣r¯ · λ¯∗(τ)∣∣ is not zero when the replica is not null.
• Optimize Detector: λ¯(τ,∆f) ∝ sinc (∆fτ). In this case the prod-
uct is between the received autocorrelation function r¯ and the
analytical expression of the autocorrelation function, which is
proportional to a sinc.
In the Classic case, the detection test is defined as the product be-
tween the AC function and a Dirac delta; on the other hand,in the
Optimize case, the detection test is defined as the product between
the AC function R and the analytical formula of the AC function of a
chirp signal. This last approach seems as a matched filter due to the
fact that the received signal is elaborated with the analytical wave-
form that is expected.
The performance of the interferer detection algorithm, described in
section 2.3.1, has been carried out in terms of probability of correct
detection , i. e.the probability that the interfering signal is present in
the received signal, and in terms of probability of false alarm, i. e.the
probability that the interfering signal is present when it should not be.
The results have been obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
In the following, the performance is characterized in terms of the
probability of detection, since, for the considered simulation settings,
a Pfa = 0 is always obtained also for a large number of Monte Carlo
iterations(106). The simulation parameters are listed in table 6.
Type of Signal Chirp Signal
Min frequency −5MHz
Max frequency 5MHz
Sampling frequency 16MHz
Signal period [10, 25, 50]µs
Table 6: Detection - Simulation Parameter
In Figure (66) and in Figure (67) the probability of detection for the
classic detector and for the optimize detector are shown in function
of the normalized threshold, evaluated according to eq.(24), with a
value of J/N = 0[dB].
In both cases, a chirp signal, generated with three different periods
[10, 25, 50]µs and represented by blue, red, green lines respectively,
has been tested in the detection algorithm. The performance show
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Figure 66: Probability of Detection - Classic Detector.
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Figure 67: Probability of Detection - Optimize Detector.
that the probability of detection is higher for the case of shorter repe-
tition period, i. e.for the chirp signal with period equal to 10µs (blue
line). According to our knowledge, this is due to the fact that on equal
terms, as J/N and observation time-window, the interfering signal
with the shorter repetition period presents more AC function peaks
and consequently the events that cross the thresholds set are more
than in the case of longer repetition period. The same happens com-
paring the performance of periods 25µs and 50µs, in both detector
cases.
2.4.3.3 IWE: Parameters Estimation
In order to test the capability of the Interferer Waveform Estimation
step described in section 2.3.3, the estimates of the signal parameter
Tˆ , φˆ, Aˆ have been evaluated by means of the Mean Square Error (MSE).
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In order to improve the jamming waveform reconstruction, it is nec-
essary to refine parameter estimates starting from the initial coarse
value through the ML criterion. The coarse estimation of the period is
carried out by evaluating the maximum of the AC function and select-
ing the corresponding lag. Exploiting the discrete time AC function,
the coarse value T is calculated as an integer value since the corre-
sponding lag mˆ is determined as an integer value depending on the
sampling rate Ts. But, the AC peak could not fall on a discrete sample
and so it is necessary to interpolate among AC function samples close
to the main peak for an increased precision. From this analysis, the
time-delay is defined by two quantities, the coarse value mˆ and the
shift δ obtained from interpolation, and expressed as:
mˆδ = mˆ+ δ (64)
The shift δ can be evaluated exploiting one of the existing sub-
sample delay estimation techniques, described in [85],[22],[23],[63].
Once a discrete delay is obtained, the fractional part of this delay is
carried out by means of the cited approaches. In our study we use the
parabolic fit interpolation that belongs to the family of the three point
fit interpolation methods. The estimation of the fractional part of the
delay is determined by fitting a curve with the two closer samples
around the main peak mˆ. The parabolic fit is a widely used meth-
ods to improve the precision of the AC peak location estimation. The
sample delay δ is determined as [16][52]:
δˆ =
Rrr∗ (mˆ+ 1) − Rrr∗ (mˆ− 1)
2 [−Rrr∗ (mˆ+ 1) + 2Rrr∗ (mˆ) − Rrr∗ (mˆ− 1)]
(65)
The parabolic fit is a widely used method to estimate the fractional
part of the sample lag. This method consists in fitting a parabola
curve among the closest samples Rrr∗ (mˆ− 1) and Rrr∗ (mˆ+ 1) around
the AC peak Rrr∗ (mˆ), where mˆ is carried out from the acquisition
step.
From eq.(64) then the refined jamming period estimate is expressed
as:
Tˆ = mˆδTs (66)
Successively, it is possible to refine the estimation of the parameter
φ. It is worthwhile to underline that in our study the initial phase
is consider equal to zero. Thus, the parameter φ represents the chirp
rate ρ which is evaluated as:
ρˆ =
Bˆ
Tˆ
(67)
where Bˆ is the estimated bandwidth evaluated through the algo-
rithm described in Chapter 1 and Tˆ is expressed in eq.(66). Succes-
sively, the received signal is dechirped, i. e.it is multiplied for the con-
jugate of the estimated ρˆ in order to balance the FM factor. After that,
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the amplitude estimate Aˆ can be evaluated as explained in the algo-
rithm 6. In addition, it could be possible to estimate also the initial
frequency of the chirp signal by means of the FT. After de-chirping
multiplication, the FT of the received signal is performed and the ini-
tial frequency is estimated as the frequency bin corresponding to the
maximum value of the PSD of the signal. Due to the structure char-
acteristics of the considered jamming signal, all these estimation pro-
cedures are performed each repetition period. Through the refined
parameters a more accurate estimation and reconstruction of the jam-
ming waveform can be determine with an increased accuracy in the
mitigation step.
The parameter used in the parameter estimation step are listed in ta-
ble 7.
Type of Signal Chirp Signal
Sampling Frequency 16[MHz]
Min frequency 0MHz
Max frequency 1.6MHz
Signal period [10, 25, 50]µs
JNRR [−5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30]
M 1600
Table 7: Estimation - Simulation Parameter
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Figure 68: MSE vs JNRR - Fs/fM = 10− T = 10[µs] − L = 10
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Figure 69: MSE vs JNRR - Fs/fM = 10− T = 25[µs] − L = 10
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Figure 70: MSE vs JNRR - Fs/fM = 10− T = 50[µs] − L = 10
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It is necessary to underline that due to the fact that the nature of
the jamming signal is not known a priori thus parameters cannot be
considered as deterministic values. In real scenarios it is not possible
to know which kind of jamming signal can disrupt the correct GNSS
functionality and consequently it is not possible to define a determin-
istic estimator and to perform the comparison with the Cramer Rao
Bound (CRB). For this reason, parameter estimates are evaluated in
terms of MSE versus the JNRR at the AC function peak (the same of
JNRAC expressed in eq. (26)). Accordingly, the correspondent value
of the JNR can be calculated inverting eq.(26) and solving a second
order problem. Consequently, the JNR value is lower than the JNRR
strongly depending on the number of samples M considered in the
AC function evaluation. Higher is M lower is JNR, with a strong dif-
ference between jamming and noise power.
In Figure 2.68(a), Figure 2.68(b), Figure 2.68(c) and Figure 2.68(d) the
MSE of parameter estimates Tˆ , φˆ, Aˆ, fˆ0 for a signal period of T = 10µs
are shown respectively. For all the parameters, increasing the value
JNRR the error in the estimation decreases rapidly. For the parameter
T the estimation error goes from 10−9 to 10−13 [s], for the parameter
A the range is 100 to 10−2, and for the parameter ρ the interval is
from 10−4 to 10−8 [1/s2]. The exception is represented by the MSE
envelope for the parameter fˆ0 that remains quite constant for all the
JNRR around the value 10−7[Hz].
In Figure 2.69(a), Figure 2.69(b), Figure 2.69(c) and Figure 2.69(d) the
MSE of parameter estimates Tˆ , φˆ, Aˆ, fˆ0 for a signal period of T = 25µs
are shown respectively. Also in this case, increasing the value JNRR
the error in the estimation decreases rapidly. For the parameter T the
estimation error goes from 10−9 to 10−13, for the parameter A the
range is 100 to 10−2, and for the parameter ρ the interval is from
10−4 to 10−9. The exception is represented by the MSE envelope for
the parameter fˆ0 that remains quite constant for all the JNRR around
the value 10−7[Hz].
In Figure 2.70(a), Figure 2.70(b), Figure 2.70(c) and Figure 2.70(d) the
MSE of parameter estimates Tˆ , φˆ, Aˆ, fˆ0 for a signal period of T = 50µs
are shown, respectively. As for the previous case, increasing the value
JNRR the error in the estimation decreases rapidly. For the parameter
T the estimation error goes from 10−9 to 10−13, for the parameter A
the range is 100 to 10−2, and for the parameter ρ the interval is from
10−4 to 10−11. The exception is represented by the MSE envelope for
the parameter fˆ0 that remains quite constant for all the JNRR around
the value 10−7[Hz].
The parameter estimation errors in function of the power at the AC
function peak for three different jamming period values have been
carried out. It can be noticed that increasing the jamming period per-
formance slightly improves as expected, but in particular for high
JNRR values. However, for all the considered parameters, the MSE is
very low, defining an efficient estimation.
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2.4.3.4 IWM: Cancellation Residual
The performance of the cancellation algorithm depends on the correct
parameter estimation results. With accurate parameter estimations a
reliable signal reconstruction is possible and consequently an effec-
tive cancellation can be performed, and a successful mitigation action
can be done reducing the malicious effect.
As indicated in table 8, we considered a chirp signal with three differ-
ents repetition periods, and with two different values of mean track-
ing memory, i. e.L = [10, 100]
Type of Signal Chirp Signal
Bandwidth 2MHz
Sampling frequency 16MHz
Signal period [10, 25, 50]µs
Mean Tracking Length L = [10, 100]
J/N [−20,−15,−10,−5, 0]dB
Table 8: Cancellation Parameter
As expressed in section 2.3.4, the cancellation is performed accord-
ing to eq.(42), but the performance evaluation is carried out in terms
of residual power, that can be written as:
 = |r− sˆ|2 (68)
In eq.(68) the left hand side  is the residual power evaluated as
the square difference between the received signal r and the estimated
and reconstructed signal sˆ.
In Figure (71) - Figure (76) the residual power after cancellation
for a chirp signal generate with three different repetition period is
shown. The performance have been evaluated ad different values of
J/N. Higher is the J/N value lower is the residual power . In addi-
tion, for all the tested cases, the higher the mean tracking length L
the lower the residual power .
These results show that the jamming waveform is strongly miti-
gated in all the tested cases. The residual power value depends on
the adopted mean tracking memory L. At J/N = 0[dB], the residual
power value decreases and fixes his own value at 10−1 and 10−2 for
value L = 10 and L = 100, respectively, defining a difference of ten
units. This is quite valid for the other J/N values, except for the low-
est ones. The gap of one decade between different values of L is due
to the fact that with a larger number of memory stack it is possible
to perform a more accurate waveform estimation and consequently a
more effective jamming mitigation. In addition, the length of the rep-
etition period affects the results of the mitigation. As the same of the
L value, with longer repetition period it is possible to better estimate
waveform parameter and then the residual power is lower. By observ-
ing Figure(72) and Figure(76), for the value J/N = 0[dB] in case of a
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Figure 71: Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs, L = 10
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Figure 72: Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs, L = 100
signal repetition period of 50µs the residual power is slightly lower
and less noisy than the case with a repetition period of 10µs.
2.4.4 Complexity Evaluation
The complexity evaluation of the algorithm has been described in
Section 2.3.5. In this section the study case of the received signal
composed by a single path has been considered, and thus the com-
putational complexity has been defined according to the first version
of the algorithm. Consequently, complexity computation in the case
of the LOS scenario is perfectly equal to the one reported in the full
description of the proposed algorithm in Section 2.3.
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Figure 73: Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs, L = 10
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Figure 74: Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs, L = 100
2.5 multipath channel
In the following, a chirp signal is considered and detection and mit-
igation techniques are described for these signals affected by multi-
path, i.e the interfering signal is subjected by different reflections and
the receiver is affected by a jamming made of more contributions.
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Figure 75: Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs, L = 10
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Figure 76: Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs, L = 100
2.5.1 System model
The considered transmitted signal is the same chirp signal used in the
non dispersive channel, expressed in eq.(46), which can be written as:
s0(t) = exp
{
±jρt
2
2
}
rect
(
t
T
)
and as in the previous case of study only the frequency up-slope case
is considered in the following. Successively, the chirp signal is mod-
eled by the multipath channel, which creates several delayed replicas
and the received signal is then defined as the sum of this delayed
74 gnss jammer in multipath scenario
contributions. Thus, the lowpass output signal, generate through the
multipath channel, is:
y˜k = s˜k ? h˜k =
Np∑
i=1
γ(mi)s˜ (k−mi) exp{−jϕk,i} (69)
where Np number of replicas, mi delay of i-th replica at the k-th
sampling instant, ϕk,i = 2pi(fc + fi)mi − fik is the phase offset due
to the replica delay and of the Doppler shift fi = vλcos(θi), v is the
jamming source velocity, λ is the wavelength and θi is the angle of
arrival of i-th replica. The equivalent baseband channel is:
h˜k =
Np∑
i=1
γ(mi)δ(k−mi) exp {−jϕk,i} (70)
where γ(mi) = |γ(mi)|ej arg{γ(mi)} is the channel coefficient dis-
tributed as complex Gaussian random variable with zero-mean and
variance equal to σ2γ
(
∼ NC
(
0,σ2γ
))
. It is possible to deduce that the
channel output y˜k is a complex Gaussian random variable equal to
the sum ofNp complex Gaussian random variables
(
∼ NC
(
0,Npσ2γ
))
.
Finally, it is possible to express the received signal as:
r˜k = y˜k + w˜k (71)
where w˜k are complex additive Gaussian white noise i.i.d samples
(∼ NC (0,N0)).
2.5.2 Autocorrelation Analysis
As in the previous section, in order to design a jammer detector the
AC function of the received signal is evaluated. It is well known that
a structured signal exhibits a periodic envelope and particular AC
properties. The AC function is expressed as:
Rr˜r˜[k,k+ `] = E[r˜k, r˜∗k+`] (72)
= E
[
(y˜k + w˜k) , (y˜k+` + w˜k+`)
∗]
= E
[
y˜k, y˜∗k+`
]
+ E
[
y˜k, w˜∗k+`
]
+ E
[
w˜k, y˜∗k+`
]
+ E
[
w˜k, w˜∗k+`
]
The first term represents the useful term of the AC function, and the
others are cross-terms between signal and noise samples which are
independent each others. These terms can be considered part of an
random variable zk,l with zero-mean and variance equal to the sum
of variance of each random variable, that are independent complex
Gaussian random variable. The mean is equal to zero because the
mean value of each random variable is zero due to the presence of
noise; instead, the variance is equal to the sum of variances of the
product of independent random variables. Taking into account two
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independent random variable a,b as in Section 2.3.1.1, the variance
of their product is evaluated as:
Var{ab} = Var{a}Var{b}+ E2[a]Var{b}+ E2[b]Var{a} (73)
The variance of each product is:
Var{y˜kw˜
∗
k+`} =
Np∑
i=1
σ2γ,i ∗N0 (74)
Var{w˜ky˜
∗
k+`} =
Np∑
i=1
σ2γ,i ∗N0
Var{w˜kw˜
∗
k+`} = N
2
0
and the variance of the total random variable zk,l is
Var{zk,l} = N0(2
Np∑
i=1
σ2γ,i +N0) (75)
It is worthwhile to notice that assuming the channel coefficients γ
independent each others then the variance Var{y˜k} can be expressed
as
Var{y˜k} =
Np∑
i=1
σ2γ,i
; on the other hand if coefficients are not independent the variance is
expressed as
Var{y˜k} = Var{
Np∑
i=1
γi}
The first term of the AC function is defined as the product of two
independent complex Gaussian random variables:
Ry˜y˜[k,k+ `] = E
[
y˜k, y˜∗k+`
]
(76)
= E
Np∑
i=1
γ(mi)s˜(k−mi)e
−jϕk,i
·
Np∑
q=1
γ∗(mq)s˜∗(k−mq + `)ejϕk+`,q

Taking into account that the channel is static and that into the time-
period T the Doppler shift due to the jamming source velocity is not
relevant, then the estimated AC function can be evaluated through the
arithmetic mean:
Rˆy˜y˜[`] =
1
L− `
L−∑`
k=1
Np∑
i=1
γ(mi)s˜(k−mi)e
−jϕk,i (77)
·
Np∑
p=1
γ∗(mp)s˜∗(k−mp + `)ejϕk+`,p

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Thus:
Rˆy˜y˜[`] =
1
L− `
L−∑`
k=1
Np∑
i=1
h˜(mi)s˜(k−mi) ·
Np∑
q=1
h˜∗(mq)x˜∗(k−mq + `)
 (78)
=
Np∑
i=1
Np∑
q=1
h˜(mi)h˜
∗(mq) · 1
L− `
L−∑`
k=1
s˜(k−mi)s˜
∗(k−mq + `)
=
Np∑
i=1
Np∑
q=1
h˜(mi)h˜
∗(mq)Rs˜s˜[`−mq +mi]
According to eq.(78) the estimated AC function Rˆy˜y˜[`] of the re-
ceived signal can be expressed as the linear combination of the AC of
the transmitted signal affected by multipath Rs˜s˜ weighted by channel
coefficients. In order to estimate the period of the transmitted signal,
it is necessary to evaluate the maximum value of the correlation func-
tion, rejecting the first maximum corresponding to the beginning of
the signal: the correspondent instant is equal to the value of the sig-
nal period. In this case with a signal affected by Np paths the number
of all the contributions in eq.(78) are N2p: the maximum value corre-
sponds to the case of perfect alignment of the received signal and
its delayed replicas, while the other combinations contribute to sec-
ondary lobes in the AC function. The expression in eq.(78) is a closed
form but it is not an explicit form, so in order to demonstrate the
behavior of the AC function it is necessary to evaluate empirically all
the possible cases of alignment of the paths.
2.5.3 Detector Design
The next step is to define the analytic expression of the decision prob-
lem regarding the detection of the correct signal period. The detection
problem is defined as a binary decision problem, which is composed
by two hypotheses:
• H1:maximum pick of the AC function. The time instant ( 6= 0)
corresponding to the maximum pick is a multiple of the signal
period, obtained when the replicas are perfectly aligned.
• H0:maximum pick is absent. There are secondary picks due to
the several cross-overlapping of the replicas. The assumption is
that the AC function is 0.
The AC function of the received signal in eq.(72), can be rewritten as:
Rr˜r˜(`) =
Np∑
i=1
Np∑
q=1
h˜(mi)h˜
∗(mq)Rs˜s˜[`−mq +mi] + RW(`) (79)
where the term RW(`) represents all the contributions due to the
cross-correlation between signal and noise and the noise autocorrela-
tion function. It is necessary to evaluate the expression of this func-
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tion under both hypotheses. Under H1 we consider the perfect align-
ment of the received signal and its local replicas. According to this, it
is possible to derive:
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Np∑
i=1
i=q
|h(mi)|
2 Rs˜s˜(`) + RW(`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(80)
where:
• RW(`) can be modeled as a Gaussian random variable: RW(`) ∼
N(0,N0)
• Rs˜s˜(`) is deterministic equal to the signal energy E under H1
and equal to 0 under H0
• |h(mi)|
2 can be considered as a random variable o a determin-
istic value
– deterministic value: each term represents the energy of the
i-th delay;
– random variable: the sum of all these quadratic terms can
be modeled as a non central chi-square distribution.
2.5.3.1 Deterministic Channel Distribution
In this paragraph the analytic expression of the decision problem in a
deterministic case is evaluated. Assuming that |h(mi)|
2 is a determin-
istic value, the sufficient statistics, under H1 hypothesis, is expressed
as a non central chi-square random variable with 2L degrees of free-
dom χ22L(d), with non centrality parameter given by:
d =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Np∑
i=1
i=q
|h(mi)|
2 Rs˜s˜(`|H1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(81)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Np∑
i=1
i=q
|h(mi)|
2 Eejφ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∑
i=1
i=q
Np
|h(mi)|
4 E2 + 2
Np∑
j=1
Np∑
i=1
j6=i
|h(mi)|
2
∣∣h(mj)∣∣2 E2

Under H0 hypothesis the sufficient statistic is expressed as a cen-
tral chi-square random variable with 2L degrees of freedom χ22L(0).
Taking into account that under H0 the AC function of the interfering
signal Rs˜s˜(`) is equal to 0, then the sufficient statistic is composed
by noise contribution RW which is modeled as a complex Gaussian
random variable.
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2.5.3.2 Random Channel Distribution
In this paragraph the analytic expression of the decision problem in
a random case is evaluated. According to eq.(70), h(mi) is a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance equal to σ2γ(
∼ N(0,σ2γ)
)
. Thus, the sufficient statistics, under H1 hypothesis, is ex-
pressed as a non central chi-square random variable with Np degrees
of freedom χ2Np(d), with non centrality parameter given by:
d =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Np∑
i=1
i=q
|h(mi)|
2 Rs˜s˜(`|H1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(82)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Np∑
i=1
i=q
|h(mi)|
2 Eejφ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
Np∑
i=1
i=q
|h(mi)|
4 E2 + 2
Np∑
i=1
Np∑
j=1
j6=i
|h(mi)|
2
∣∣h(mj)∣∣2 E2

It is worthwhile to notice that in this case the non centrality pa-
rameter is a random variable due to the presence of |h(mi)|
2. Thus,
the non-centrality parameter has a probability density function and
the evaluation of the decision problem becomes more complex and
difficult to be solved in an analytical way. On the other hand, as for
the deterministic case, under H0 hypothesis taking into account that
under H0 the AC function of the interfering signal Rs˜s˜(`) is equal to
0, then the sufficient statistic is composed by noise contribution RW
which is modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable.
2.5.4 Numerical Results
As stated in the previous section, in order to confer effectiveness to
our study, empirical simulations have been carried out. In this sec-
tion all the numerical results of the analytical study carried out in the
previous sections are shown as results of several simulations. The per-
formance have been carried out in the same way as the Non Dispersive
Channelscenario. In the following a multipath scenario is considered
according to the UMTS standard [26]. In Figure (77) the considered
scenario is shown.
In Section 2.5.4.1 the validation of the hypotheses on AC function in
a multipath scenario are reported. In Section 2.5.4.2 the result of the
detection of an interfering signal in a multipath scenario is shown
in terms of probability of detection. In Sections 2.5.4.3 and 2.5.4.4
results on parameter estimation and cancellation residual are shown,
respectively.
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Figure 77: Multipath Scenario
2.5.4.1 Approximation Validation
According to eq.(78), the AC function is defined by the sum of N2p =
36 terms (6 paths in UMTS standard), and as explained before, the
maximum value of the AC function corresponds to the perfect align-
ment between received signal and its delayed replicas, and the other
peaks are due to the cross-overlaps between the paths. Let us consider
a received signal composed by the sum of three paths with delays
0, 600, 300[ns] corresponding to sample delays equal to 0, 10, 48[samples],
respectively; the other simulation parameters in table 9 are the same.
Type of Signal Chirp Signal
Min frequency 0MHz
Max frequency 8MHz
Sampling frequency 16MHz
Signal period 25µs
Signal period 400 [samples]
Time-window 0.1s
Number of paths 6
Path Delays [0, 310, 710, 1090, 1730, 2510]ns
Path Powers [0,−1,−9,−10,−15,−20]dB
Table 9: Simulation Parameters
In figure (78) the estimated AC function of a multipath signal with
6 paths is shown. The multipath channel is defined according to the
UMTS standard model [26]. It is possible to observe the periodic be-
havior of the AC function with equally spaced peaks, which represent
the periodicity of the signal.
In figure (79) a zoom of the previous figure is shown. It is possible
to notice that the peaks of the AC function correspond to the signal
period in samples and its multiples.
In figure (80) the AC function is shown and it is possible to notice
that the major peaks are located in the first ±50[samples].
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Figure 78: Estimated Autocorrelation function of Multipath signal with 6
paths.
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Figure 79: Zoom on Estimated Autocorrelation function of Multipath signal
with 6 paths.
In figure (81) a more detailed AC function is shown. It is possible to
observe that the major peaks, except that one in 0, are located on lags
±10,±38,±48[samples]. These peaks are due to the overlapping of
the received signal and the local replica. In particular, when the local
replica is shifted of :
• +10[samples] the major contribution is due to the overlapping
between the second path of the received signal and the first path
of local replica (plus other minor contributions);
• +38[samples] the major contribution is due to the overlapping
between the third path of the received signal and the second
path of the local replica (plus other minor contributions);
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Figure 80: Zoom on Estimated Autocorrelation function of Multipath signal
with 3 paths.
• +48[samples] the major contribution is due to the overlapping
between the third path of the received signal and the first path
of the local replica (plus other minor contributions);
Thus, it is possible to deduce that the maximum value of the AC
function corresponds to the perfect alignment of the received signal
and the local replica.
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Figure 81: Zoom on Estimated Autocorrelation function of Multipath signal
with 3 paths.
2.5.4.2 ID: Probability of Detection
According to the theoretical analysis of the binary decision derived in
section 2.3.1.2, the detection test has been defined exploiting the ML
criterion. The likelihood ratio in eq.(38) depends on the time-shift τ
and the bandwidth ∆f and it is not simple to compute without any
assumption. In Multipath scenario the probabilities density functions
for both hypotheses are quite different with respect to the LOS case,
due to the characteristics of the received signal. For this reason, the
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analytical expression of the likelihood ratio is different and not simple
to derive.
However, the performance of the interferer detection algorithm, de-
scribed in section 2.3.1, has been carried out in terms of probability
of correct detection , i. e.the probability that the interfering signal is
present in the received signal, and in terms of probability of false
alarm, i. e.the probability that the interfering signal is present when
it should not be. The results have been obtained by means of Monte
Carlo simulations. Only the probability of detection is shown, since,
for the considered simulation settings, a Pfa = 0 is always obtained
due to a large number of Monte Carlo iterations(106).
The simulation parameters used in the detection step of the algo-
rithm are listed in table 10.
Type of Signal Chirp Signal
Min frequency −5MHz
Max frequency 5MHz
Sampling frequency 16MHz
Signal period [10, 25, 50]µs
Number of paths 6
Path Delays [0, 310, 710, 1090, 1730, 2510]ns
Path Power [0,−1,−9,−10,−15,−20]dB
Table 10: Detection - Simulation Parameter
In Figure (82) and Figure (83) the probability of detection in aMultipath
scenario is reported, in both classic and normalized received power,
respectively . It is worthwhile to notice that the probability of detec-
tion in Figure (82) is slightly better than the LOS case in Figure (66).
This is due to the fact that there is more input energy thus also the
secondary peaks are detected when the AC main peak crosses the set
threshold. On the other hand, in Figure (83) the performance is worse,
due to the normalization in terms of the received power and conse-
quently the AC peaks result powerful without crossing set thresholds.
However, the reference threshold is the same used for the LOS case
evaluated according to eq.(24), with a value of J/N = 0[dB]. As for the
LOS case, the performance improves for interferer signal with shorter
repetition period.
2.5.4.3 IWE: Parameters Estimation
The evaluation of the performance of the parameter etimation algo-
rithm has been deeply described in Section 2.4.3.3 for the LOS scenario.
For the Multipath scenario the evaluation in terms of MSE for each con-
sidered parameters it is quite analytically difficult. This is due to the
fact that the received signal is composed by several delayed replicas
that complicate the estimation of the true parameter at each repetition
period. In addition, in order to define a correct estimation it is neces-
sary to take into account the channel coefficients that characterize the
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Figure 82: Multipath - Probability of Detection.
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Figure 83: Multipath - Probability of Detection.
considered scenario. All these aspects have to be evaluated at each
repetition period and it could be computationally expensive, taking
into account that the proposed algorithm does note include any rake
receiver method, used to acquire in a fast way the signal affected by
multipath.
For these reasons, the parameter estimation evaluation in a multipath
scenario is not carried out in our study.
2.5.4.4 IWM: Cancellation Residual
As already stated, the performance of the cancellation algorithm de-
pends on the correct parameter estimation results: an accurate param-
eter estimation determines a reliable signal reconstruction and conse-
quently an effective cancellation can be performed, and a successful
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mitigation action can be done reducing the malicious effect. In the
following, two different kinds of simulations are shown. First, can-
cellation residual on varying of time is presented, as already carried
out in the LOS case. Successively, cancellation residual in frequency
domain is shown, also performing the cancellation in presence of the
useful GNSS signal.
For time-varying cancellation results, parameters listed in table 8 are
considered, adding the multipath channel model. In Figure (84) - Fig-
ure (89) the residual power after cancellation for a chirp signal af-
fected by multipath and generated with three different repetition pe-
riod is shown. The performance have been evaluated at different val-
ues of J/N: the higher the J/N value the lower the residual power .
In addition, as for the LOS scenario, for all the tested cases, the higher
the mean tracking length L the lower the residual power .
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Figure 84: Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs, L = 10
These results show that the jamming waveform is strongly miti-
gated in all the tested cases even if the jamming is affected by multi-
path propagation. The residual power value depends on the adopted
mean tracking memory L. At J/N = 0[dB], the residual power value
decreases and fixes his own value at 3 ∗ 10−1 and 4 ∗ 10−2 for value
L = 10 and L = 100, respectively, defining a difference of quite ten
units. This is quite valid for the other J/N values, except for the low-
est ones. However, it is possible to notice that the performance are
worse than the LOS scenario, as expected. As already stated in the
LOS case, the gap of one decade between different values of L is due
to the fact that with a larger number of memory stack it is possible
to perform a more accurate waveform estimation and consequently a
more effective jamming mitigation. In addition, the length of the rep-
etition period affects the results of the mitigation. As the same of the
L value, with longer repetition period it is possible to better estimate
waveform parameter and then the residual power is lower.
Moving from these results, in the following the performance of the
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Figure 85: Residual power after cancellation: T = 10µs, L = 100
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Figure 86: Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs, L = 10
jamming cancellation in frequency domain is shown. The parameters
characterizing the cancellation simulation in the frequency domain
are reported in table 11.
In Figure 90, Figure 91, Figure 92 cancellation results are shown.
The considered jamming signal is generated with a bandwidth of
8[MHz], a period T = 10[µs] and then passes form the multipath chan-
nel, defined by 6 taps (according to UMTS model). The simulations
have been carried out considering a variation of the JNR, for values
in the range −10, 10[dB]. For value JNR = −10[dB] the residual after
the cancellation (red line), evaluated as the difference between the re-
ceived signal (blue line) and the estimated waveform (green line), is
equal to 101. For value JNR = 0[dB] and JNR = 10[dB] the residual
stops itself at value 100 and 10−1, respectively. The residual decreases
from 101 to 10−1 increasing the JNR from −10[dB] to 10[dB], thus
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Figure 87: Residual power after cancellation: T = 25µs, L = 100
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
101
Time [s]
R
es
id
ua
l
Multipath Cancellation: T = 5e−05 [s] − B = 2 [MHz] − L = 10
 
 
J/N = −20 dB
J/N = −15 dB
J/N = −10 dB
J/N =  −5 dB
J/N =   0 dB
Figure 88: Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs, L = 10
higher is the considered JNR more efficient are the estimation and
cancellation results, as expected.
In Figure 93 and Figure 94 shown results have been obtained on
variation of the memory tracking length L. It is worthwhile to notice
that the waveform estimate (green line) is less noisy in case of L =
100 than with L = 10 because with a greater memory stack a more
effective average can be performed, reducing the noise power.
In Figure 95 Figure 96 and Figure 97 a different analysis is given, ac-
cordingly to the variation of the jamming signal bandwidth. Decreas-
ing the value Fs/fM and thus increasing the bandwidth, the jamming
spectrum becomes more spread and lower, as expected.
Furthermore, improved results have been carried out. In the fol-
lowing figures, the performance is still evaluated in terms of residual
after cancellation, but now also the GNSS signal is considered, and it
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Figure 89: Residual power after cancellation: T = 50µs, L = 100
Type of Signal Chirp Signal
Sampling frequency 16MHz
Min frequency 0MHz
Fs/fM [10, 5, 2]MHz
Max frequency [1.6, 3.2, 8]MHz
Signal period [10, 25, 50]µs
Number of paths 6
Path Delays [0, 310, 710, 1090, 1730, 2510]ns
Path Power [0,−1,−9,−10,−15,−20]dB
Mean Tracking Memory L = [10, 100]
Table 11: Cancellation - Simulation Parameter
is added to the jamming signal. The considered GNSS signal is a Bi-
nary Offset Carrier (BOC) and in particular is a BOC(1,1), synthesized
in MATLAB tool. It is worthwhile to underline that the GNSS signal
is not affected by multipath propagation but it is assumed it is in LOS
propagation.
In Figure 98, Figure 99 and Figure 100 cancellation results are shown.
Now, the residual (red line) has the same envelope of the BOC spec-
trum. It is possible to notice that increasing the JNR from −10[dB] to
10[dB] the residual decreases from 101 to 10−1, as exspected. More-
over, with higher JNR the BOC spectrum more with the main lobes
higly identifiable.
Also in this case, the estimation is better with a greater mean mem-
ory tracking L. In Figure 101 and Figure 102 results are shown, high-
lightening that the waveform estimate (green line) is still less noise
with L = 100 than L = 10, as espected.
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Figure 90: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = −10dB− Fs/fM = 2−
T = 10µs− L = 10
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Figure 91: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB− Fs/fM = 2− T =
10µs− L = 10
In Figure 103, Figure 104 and Figure 105 cancellation performance
is defined on the variation of the jamming bandwidth. As described
for the previous case, decreasing the the value Fs/fM interfering
bandwidth increases. Even if a BOC signal is present, the cancella-
tion is effective for all the considered values, with acceptable results
also for worse case scenario JNR = 0[dB].
In this section numerical results of the cancellation of a jamming
signal affected by multipath have been showed. Results demonstrate
that the ICC algorithm is still efficient in worse scenario, as urban
canyon and high reflecting areas. Performance have been evaluated
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Figure 92: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 10dB − Fs/fM = 2 −
T = 10µs− L = 10
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Figure 93: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 10dB − Fs/fM = 2 −
T = 10µs− L = 100
also in presence of a BOC signal, in order to emulate as better as
possible real scenarios. Also in this extra study-case the algorithm
still works and it is able to perform jamming mitigation and thus to
extract useful information.
2.5.5 Complexity Evaluation
As already done for the LOS case, it is necessary to estimate the com-
putational complexity of the proposed algorithm in the study-case
scenario. The algorithm is defined by four steps and for each of
them a complexity evaluation has been already carried out in Sec-
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Figure 94: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 10dB − Fs/fM = 2 −
T = 10µs− L = 10
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Figure 95: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB − Fs/fM = 10 −
T = 10µs− L = 10
tion 2.3.5.1, Section 2.3.5.2,Section 2.3.5.3. It is worthwhile to notice
that the application of the shown algorithm in Multipath scenario
does not require any modification. It was supposed that the solution
might consist in a simple replication in parallel of the ICC algorithm
(described in [28],[29]) into a sufficient number of branches to match
all the significant multipath components. Instead, the main idea of
this approach comes from recognizing that propagation through a
time-dispersive channel does not destroy, but rather transform, the
AC structure of a waveform. By exploiting this characteristic, it is
possible to preserve the ICC algorithm and to apply it in a non dis-
2.6 conclusions 91
−0.5 −0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
103
104
105
Multipath Estimation and Cancellation
@Fs2fM = 5 − T = 10[µ s] − Fs = 16 [MHz] − J/N = 0 [dB] − L = 10
Normalized Frequencies
Po
w
er
 S
pe
ct
ra
l D
en
sit
y
 
 
Received
Estimated
Difference
Figure 96: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB− Fs/fM = 5− T =
10µs− L = 10
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Figure 97: Multipath Cancellation Residual - JNR = 0dB− Fs/fM = 2− T =
10µs− L = 10
persive channel, without increasing the complexity of the proposed
approach.
2.6 conclusions
In this chapter a solution for the management of jamming signal in a
Multipath scenario was presented. The whole study was only focused
on the interfering signal neglecting the useful one. First, a study of
the jammer through the non dispersive channel was carried out. Start-
ing from the results shown in [28], an analytical study was presented
in order to expand the ICC algorithm already explained in [29]. In the
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Figure 98: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = −10dB −
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10
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Figure 99: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 0dB− Fs/fM =
2− T = 10µs− L = 10
first part of the chapter the attention was focused on the analytical
study of the AC for a chirp signal. The analytical expression of the
AC function was then used to design the matched detector in order
to detect as well as possible the presence of the jamming signal. Nu-
merical results showed that the performance by means of probability
of detection was slightly better in case of an optimized detector, due
to the higher energy of the detection test (in the same way as for a
matched filter). Regarding the estimation and mitigation steps, simu-
lation results were showed in [28] and [29].
In the second part of the Chapter, the attention was focused on the
study of the jammer affected by multipath. The dispersive channel
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Figure 100: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 10dB −
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10
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Figure 101: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 10dB −
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10
has been defined according to the UMTS standard [26]. In addition,
the useful signal has been neglected in order to focus on the inter-
fering event. The considered jamming signal was a chirp signal, with
periodic envelope and structured characteristics of the AC function.
Due to the dispersive propagation, the received signal was defined as
the sum of all the delayed replicas, with different received power,
different delays and phases at the receiver side. Then, as for the
LOS case, an analytical study of the AC function with a multipath
signal was proposed. Through this evaluation, it was possible to de-
fine the AC function as a linear combination of the delayed replicas
weighted by the channel coefficients. Simulation results showed that
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Figure 102: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 10dB −
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 100
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Figure 103: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 0dB −
Fs/fM = 10− T = 10µs− L = 10
this mathematical expression is valid due to the fact that the AC func-
tion presents more than one secondary peaks, due to the overlapping
of the delayed replicas. Successively, the detection of the interferer
was carried out exploiting the properties of the AC function as for the
non-dispersive channel. The performance of the detection step was
determined through the evaluation of the probability of detection.
Numerical results showed that in case of signal affected by multipath
the detection is slightly better than the LOS case due to the presence of
important secondary peaks that increases the probability of detection.
In addition, the algorithm was tested also in terms of residual power
cancellation. Results showed that even if the signal is composed by
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Figure 104: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 0dB −
Fs/fM = 5− T = 10µs− L = 10
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Figure 105: Multipath Cancellation: Residual & GNSS - JNR = 0dB −
Fs/fM = 2− T = 10µs− L = 10
delayed replicas, the algorithm is able to estimate and reconstruct
the signal and then to subtract it from the received one. Thus, the
mitigation step still works also for the dispersive channel scenario.
Furthermore, the procedure is still effective also in presence of the
GNSS signal. As matter of fact, in the estimation stage it is possible to
reconstruct the jamming signal, which have higher energy than the
useful one, and after mitigation the received spectrum is defined by
only the useful signal. Consequently, the GNSS signal is not removed
with the interfering signal but it is extracted from the received signal
after the jamming cancelation. Even if the tested signal is a simulated
signal, the results showed in this chapter demonstrate that the exten-
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sion to the Multipath scenario is a valid solution to counteract jam-
ming signal propagating in a urban scenario, and so to make more
reliable the GNSS transmission also in complex environment. In addi-
tion, the extension of the algorithm to a dispersive channel scenario
was performed without any modification to the main structure of the
proposed procedure, thus without increasing the complexity of the
algorithm and making the procedure implementable.
I N T E R F E R E N C E M A N A G E M E N T T E C H N I Q U E S :
F U RT H E R D E V E L O P M E N T S
It is well known that interference in GNSS is still an open challenge. In
the previous chapters some approaches have been described. In the
final chapter it has been shown that it is also possible to mitigate a
jamming in worse scenario, introducing a possible research direction
in the future developments.
Even if several literature works have been proposed and several
techniques deeply investigated, improvements can be carried out. In
this part I detection and mitigation techniques have been described.
It has been shown that lower is the signal power, more difficult is the
detection and consequently the mitigation, as expected. The whole
study has been focused on the statistical characterization of the jam-
ming event neglecting the useful GNSS signal. For this reason, the
provided approach has been evaluated for lower power level of the
interfering signal, even if the impact on the useful signal is not effec-
tive.
In addition, the mitigation step is still an open topic. In the second
part of the second chapter it has been demonstrated that jamming
signal can be mitigated also when affected by multipath propagation.
The used method exploits the periodic characteristic of the interfer-
ing signal. The obtained results are an useful start for further devel-
opments in this direction. In particular, the attention will be focused
on the increasing problem represented by the spoofing signal that is
more complex than the previous jamming signals, considered in the
described results.
Due to this, efficient anti-jamming and anti-spoofing techniques
will be needed in order to counteract with more sophisticated distur-
bances and guarantee the reliability of the GNSS infrastructure.
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Part II
S P O O F I N G T H R E AT
Spoofing is notoriously classified as the most dangerous
threat of the GNSS infrastructure. Its main goal is to mis-
lead the receiver tracking it and sending wrong informa-
tion about its position. The receiver is not conscious of this
attack, and it acquires the counterfeit signal and discards
the authentic one. The rapid diffusion of GNSS location-
based applications in a large set of human activities makes
the navigation system infrastructure very vulnerable against
malicious attacks which aim to disrupt the functionalities
for illegal purposes. Taking into account this scenario, ef-
ficient and computationally efficient detection and mitiga-
tion techniques are required in order to counteract spoof-
ing signals.
The aim of this part II is to present possible and simple ap-
proaches in the spoofing detection field. Scenarios affected
by spoofing signals are considered and detection methods
are described pointing out the principal steps and possible
applications, without neglecting drawbacks.

3
S P O O F I N G I N G N S S
3.1 introduction
The easy accessibility to the GNSS signal combined with a non security
feature, as a cryptographic signature, in the signal modulation and
data streams, makes civil infrastructures using open GNSS strongly
vulnerable to jamming and spoofing attacks due to the predictability
of open GNSS signals. RFI is considered as the most disruptive event
for the GNSS system. As reported in [45][11], RFI affects the opera-
tion of the AGC and Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) in the RF front-end
and it can also deny the correct functions of carrier an code track-
ing loops [14][10], causing deterioration and loss of lock in signal
reception [36][76]. Thus, due to the high possibility of such attacks,
the GNSS security is a very important topic and consequently inten-
tional interfering attacks are a serious threat for the overall navigation
system, considering the rife diffusion in the daily human life appli-
cations as emergency and safety-of-life ones 1. In [74] and [78] an
exhaustive evaluation of the spoofing threat in civil GPS infrastruc-
ture is provided. However, the attention is focused on the increasing
risk of successful spoofing attacks due to the easy accessibility and
cheap costs of the hardware and software equipment. Accordingly, it
is possible to trick a receiver transmitting a counterfeit signal with
false estimates of PVT solutions, without any awareness due to the in-
trinsic reliability on the receiver output. If an attack is successful the
navigation solutions are not reliable and the consequences are obvi-
ous, as misleading the navigation receiver. The aforementioned prob-
lem is debated within the chapter analyzing the effects on the GPS L1
frequency signal, considerations that can be extended to other types
of signals an navigation systems. Interference is a difficult threat for
the GNSS infrastructure, and different type of jamming signal can be
identified. Among them, the major issue is represented by the GNSS-
like signals as meaconing and spoofing, as well. The former is the
most simplistic way to generate a satellite navigation signal. In or-
der to define a meaconing attack, it is necessary to have a passive
antenna which receives the useful signal, then an amplifier and a
transmission antenna which works at the same GPS frequency of the
useful signal. All the receivers close to the jamming source detect
the broadcast signal and decode the previous antenna position and
not their own. It is possible to detect the presence of a meaconing
attack if the rebroadcast signal has a higher power than the origi-
nal signal. The latter instead is more sophisticated. It can be made
by a GPS generator and then it is broadcast. In [36] a sophisticated
case is provided. The spoofer was located close to the GPS receiver
1 Described in: [36][74][67][68][69][79][46][38] [34][35][78]
101
102 spoofing in gnss
in order to acquire the signal characteristics. Successively, the jam-
mer was able to reproduce the signal and by slowly increasing its
own transmitting power it captured the target receiver that tracked
the counterfeit signal, thus decoding wrong PVT solutions. Authors
showed that spoofing goes beyond the aim of denying the correct
communications between transmitter and receiver, but its own aim
is to mislead the target receiver sending incorrect position and time
information. In this chapter possible approaches to counteract spoof-
ing events are discussed. Taking into account all the results provided
in [4], we proposed possible improvements exploiting AGC properties
jointly to other metric measurements of the GPS receiver. The follow-
ing sections will present a survey of the previous approaches and
countermeasures in RFI and spoofing detection with particular atten-
tion on Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM) and AGC-based techniques.
First, a brief introduction of the existing techniques is provided in
Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 a well referred to SQM approaches review
is reported. Successively, in Section 3.4 the concept of the AGC is de-
scribed also in its application as a spoofer detection combined with
the correlator and C/N0 measurements. Numerical results have been
carried out studying and extracting information from collected data
and they are showed in Section 3.5 in order to validate our approach.
Finally, in Section 3.6 conclusions are provided with possible improve-
ments.
3.2 literature survey
At the beginning of GPS working system, several studies showed that
the the recent systems could be susceptible to intentional jamming
attacks. The countermeasure was to introduce a Y-code component
to the military P-code signal in order to guarantee a reliable and ef-
fective transmission [37][75]. Apparently, these methods was recog-
nized as a powerful technique in order to limit and avoid spoofing
attacks. The drawback was that researchers did not take into account
the possibility of spoofing attacks in civil infrastructure [60][57],[50].
This method assumed that the encrypted P(Y)-code is free of spoof-
ing, and a reference receiver set at a safe location that is not subject to
spoofing. The user receiver is the possible spoofing victim. Statistic of
cross correlation between two receivers allows detecting the spoofing
at a victim receiver. Although, it requires a secure communications
link and a second receiver in order to exploit correlation properties
it is still one of the more effective low computational methodologies
proposed to date and it leverages the existing military signals.
Furthermore, it could be possible to design civil signal waveform
which have intrinsic anti-spoofing capabilities. These have been inves-
tigated and candidates proposed [66]. In any case, the signal design
cycle is extremely long and it requires modifications in GNSS infras-
tructure, so it is hard to implement these new waveforms in the near
future.
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A possible detection approach is defined by observing the behavior
of the user’s position or time estimates, usually for less sophisticated
jamming attacks. If an unrealistic time-position jump occurs, as deter-
mined by the navigation Kalman filter, this could be used as flag of
spoofing event. Several examples have been presented in [62][77].
Similarly, Receive Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) tech-
niques are able to detect malicious events. These techniques can be
employed at position solution level and they are quite effective for the
less sophisticated attacks. These methods are not computationally ex-
pensive though the single epoch mechanism for detection is quite sen-
sitive to the jump magnitude-filter tuning. However, RAIM techniques
work very well only if few spoofing events occur among several au-
thentic solutions. On the other hand, if the majority of the signals are
spoofed RAIM techniques discard the authentic signal, cause the main
goal is to minimize the residual among received solutions.
In case of a single GPS antenna, detection can be performed lever-
aging a well-known technique based on adding inertial sensors and
also cross checking the consistency of dynamics [82][47]. This method
tests a residual between GPS spoofed measurements and inertial mea-
surements, and monitors their discrepancies. Due to the availability
and low cost of multi-axis MEMS accelerometers, the implementation
of these techniques should be quite effective to consider and cross-
compare reported movement, raising a confidence flag when they do
not agree. However, the majority of common GPS receivers do not
have such sensors. Furthermore, low cost inertial sensors are effective
only in a short space of operating time under continuous spoofing
environments, besides high-end sensors are more expensive than GPS
receivers.
Spoofing detection and mitigation techniques could be defined mod-
ifying the pattern of the receiver’s antenna. The GPS antenna is either
omnidirectional (mobile devices) or hemispherical (fixed locations)
and receives signals from all directions. A multi-antenna receiver can
implement array techniques to steer beams toward the known direc-
tion of the satellites and nulls toward interfering power sources. Thus,
the antenna array is one of the few methods that can both flag and
attempt to mitigate a potential spoofing event when it occurs. Re-
searchers have also proposed a synthetic array, applicable for a single
antenna dynamic receiver, which is able to determine the presence
of a spoofing source. It is functional but it has the drawback of in-
creasing complexity and it is only applicable for a single stationary
spoofing source [56][20].
The major limitation of spoofing is how it transmits the counterfeit
GNSS signals. The fake signals are transmitted by the same wireless
channel and they have the same propagation characteristics, regard-
less if the GNSS receiver is moving or not. A signal spatial correlation
test was conducted to detect the spoofing [17]. The counterfeit sig-
nals are spatially correlated even if the GNSS antenna receiver is mov-
ing along an arbitrary trajectory. The detection technique was based
on the monitoring of amplitude and Doppler correlation between all
(fake and authentic) tracked signals. The presence of a spoofing at-
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tack is defined when a pairwise correlation is evaluated. However,
it is worth to notice that this method was carried out in a scenario
where multipath fading was absent and considering a fixed/station-
ary spoofing source.
Another possible technique consists in observing the channel com-
ponents of the tracked signals. In [5] the described detection tech-
nique is based on the analysis of multipath components that affect
GNSS signals propagation. A spoofing signal could be considered as a
delayed replica of the authentic GNSS signal. The fundamental aspect
is to observe the behavior in term of amplitude, delay and phase com-
ponent of all the tracked paths. In case of a spoofing event these three
parameters have different time envelope with respect to the multi-
path reflection. For example if the delay increases but the amplitude
does not decrease as expected, according to the rules of multipath
propagation, the presence of spoofing could be determined. A pre-
despreading detection technique is presented in [42]. It consists in
observing GNSS signal features in order to assess the presence of a
spoofing signal before the de-spreading stage of the GNSS receiver.
This technique operates on raw samples data looking at the abnormal
behavior of the signal power content of the GPS spectrum. In this way
a counterfeit event could be detected in the digital domain, exploit-
ing the Delay and Multiply (DAM) property of the GPS code when
the spoofing event has enough power to interrupt normal receiver’s
operation. In [44] a spoofing detection and protection technique is
described. This method consists in statistical tests of Doppler, C/N0
and PVT solutions and relies on the information that the receiver ob-
tained before the suspected spoofing attack. All these steps are per-
formed by an independent module in the receiver operation chain
that is able to keep memory of the GNSS signal’s statistics. The pro-
posed tests are based on monitoring the variance of Doppler offset
and C/N0 which change with the presence of spoofing, defining dis-
tortion in the metrics. Once the spoofing is detected, the receiver uses
stored information to start the correct acquisition procedure. How-
ever, this solution requires a complex processing unit inside the GNSS
tracking chain with consequently computational costs. Moreover, sev-
eral attempts for detection of GNSS spoofing events, even the most
sophisticated ones, have been done in the signal processing domain.
Most of them exploit correlation measurement and apply SQM tech-
niques. The scope is to find, if present, additional correlation peaks
that can show a possible spoofing attack [81][73][55]. Unfortunately,
in order to have an updated correlator measurement, the computa-
tional complexity of the receiver has to be increase. Even if this could
be possible, the next challenge is being able to discern between spoof-
ing attack and multipath propagation effects.
An exhaustive review of the spoofing detection methods is provided
in [43].
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3.3 spoofing detection : signal quality monitoring tech-
niques
Monitoring and detecting anomalies and disturbances on received
signals are important steps to assess that receiver could be affected by
a counterfeit signal. In order to have reliable positioning and naviga-
tion solutions, it is necessary to monitor the quality of the broadcast
GPS signals. Several methods to detect anomalies by observing PVT
solutions or processing received data have been investigated. Among
these methods, SQM is the rising one. It is based on observing the
behavior on time of the correlation shape by comparing outputs with
a well-defined metric: the most common SQM tests are the Delta and
Ratio tests, designed to identify asymmetric correlation peaks and to
identify abnormal shape of the correlation peaks, respectively [59]. In
previous literature, SQM techniques have been proposed as a method
to monitor in time the envelope of the correlation function in mul-
tipath scenarios [27]. In the tracking stage the effects of a possible
spoofing event are very similar to multipath ones: distortions of the
correlation outputs due to the spoofing attack could be assessed as
a strong multipath which is in-phase with the authentic signal. Thus,
the SQM method has been extended for detection of spoofing attacks.
In [19] authors have implemented the Ratio Test metric, proposed
in [27], to detect any asymmetry and distortion in the correlation out-
puts due to an intermediate spoofing attack. They have observed both
code and carrier tracking stages: the alignment of the fake signal in
code-phase and carrier domains determines not suitable outputs from
Delay Lock Loop (DLL) and Phase-Locked Loop (PLL). In [49] authors
have analyzed two cases of intermediate spoofing attack. Firstly, the
spoofer has to align its counterfeit signal to the authentic one, and
possibly (once aligned) it has to increase the power on order to be
tracked. This kind of spoofer is able to reach the code-phase align-
ment with the authentic GPS signal, that could be in constructive or
not constructive interference. It was showed that the delta and ratio
test are not able to detect the spoofing event if this is in constructive
interference with the real signal. On the other hand, when the fake
signal is out of phase with the authentic one Delta and Ratio test dis-
criminators have different values from the nominal case, i.e. when the
spoofer is not detected. However, it is necessary that the attack is not
rapid in order to detect the presence of the spoofer. Thus, it could be
assessed that SQM antispoofing techniques are valid methods to detect
the counterfeit event with the assumption that the receiver already
tracked the authentic signal. However, these methods could present
some issues in a multipath propagation scenario because they could
not distinguish between spoofing attack and a delayed reflection, so
the detection flag will be raised if one of these occurs. For this reason,
the implementation of a joint metric detection technique is needed.
In [6] authors have proposed to use extra correlators jointly with the
Ratio Test metric in order to overcome the ambiguity problem in de-
tecting spoofer or multipath event. An important step is to define the
setting of the correlator and extra-correlator, in order to detect vesti-
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gial signal presence. It is necessary that the two implemented metrics
can be effective in the same portion of code delay. On the contrary,
they will share only a small part and the detection results will be
not reliable. In addition, it is possible that the effects of counterfeit
signal could not be present in both metrics during the same time of
observation. Thus, it is necessary to extend the observation time and
a parallel check in both metrics is required: if both metrics present
a high probability of detection, the receiver is able to distinguish be-
tween spoofer and multipath events. However, this joint detection
techniques is not reliable with a high power spoofing signal. The
strong counterfeit signal hides the real signal under the noise floor
and the receiver is not able to understand that the tracked signal is the
fake one: Ratio Test does not detect any distortion in the correlation
function shape. Another joint detection technique has been proposed
in [80]. The authors have described a non-cryptographic method for
spoofing detection that consists in implementing jointly a correlation
function distortion monitor and a total in-band power monitor. This
technique relies on the incapability of a spoofer device to maintain for
long time a low-power attack in order to not cause abnormal shape in
the receiver correlator outputs. These two independent metrics con-
sist in a symmetric difference between an early-late correlator pair
(non-normalized Delta Test) and the measure of the total power in
receiver bandwidth. The first metric aims to detect distortions in the
correlation shape. The reliability of this result depends on the choice
of the time-offset between the early and late local replica. The power
monitor metric aims to measure the nominal value of the in-band
power and to detect anomalies in increasing power when a spoofing
event occurs.
In conclusion, many literature works state that SQM techniques are ef-
ficient spoofing detection solutions in a LOS scenario. However, with
distorted propagation channel, i. e.the signal is affected by multipath
and/or huge atmospheric interferences, the aforementioned techniques
are not able to perfectly distinguish the presence or absence of the
spoofing event.
3.4 proposed architecture
In the previous sections, literature reviews for detection spoofing tech-
niques and in particular for SQM approaches have been described. It
is well known that the structure of the spoofing signal is GNSS-like,
because it is generated in order to tick and mislead the target re-
ceiver. However, so that the attack to be effective, spoofing source has
to reproduce and broadcast at least four Pseudorandom Noise (PRN)
signals. And if an attack occurs, the detection is still difficult in partic-
ular before the de-spreading step. Some methods have been already
presented, as the constant monitoring of the AGC response in order
to measure unexpected values [4]. The provided method is very ef-
fective, but its main drawback consists in requiring enough informa-
tion about the AGC component: it is not implementable in GNSS soft-
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ware receiver because it is not working with digital domain samples.
Moving from these considerations, a method that consists in the joint
observation of measurement outputs from different components of
the GNSS receiver is proposed. The main goal is to provide a possi-
ble detection technique based on the observation of the AGC signal
waveform aided with the information carried out from the correla-
tion function and from the estimation of the C/N0. For this purpose,
firstly a description of the scenario is provided followed by the intro-
duction to each metric used to detect the jamming threat.
3.4.1 System model
In [43] a simplistic expression of a spoofing signal is defined. As al-
ready said, the spoofing source generates many counterfeit PRNs that
have quite the same power level of the authentic ones, a bit higher in
order to attract the target to be spoofed. The spoofed received signal
is written as [43]:
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where Ts is the sampling interval, φ is the carrier phase, f is the
Doppler frequency, p is the signal power and τ is the code delay;
the subscripts m and q (and the upscripts a and s) correspond to
authentic and spoofed PRN signal, respectively. The symbol h(nTs)
represents the transmitted data the and c(nTs) is the PRN sequence,
M is the total number of authentic and N of spoofed received signals;
η(nTs) is the complex AWGN with zero-mean and variance equal to σ2.
According to the value of spoofed PRNs it is possible to differentiate
the type of the spoofing attack. However, the spoofing source has to
generate signal with a very similar power to the authentic ones, and
consequently the received power level increases due to the jamming
contributions [43].
3.4.2 Automatic Gain Control
The AGC adjusts the power level of the intermediate frequency signal
at Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) input in order to minimize the
quantization loss. The presence of the AGC is necessary to calibrate
the gain in order to define a correct received input power. It is well
know that the GNSS signal power at the Earth’s surface is below the
thermal noise floor, which is expressed as:
PN = kTABW (84)
where k is the Boltzmann’s constant, TA is the antenna temperature
and BW is the bandwidth. The thermal noise is then added to the
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noise of the front end components, defining the total noise power as
the predominant value, written as:
PN,total = k (TA + TR)BW (85)
where TR is the equivalent receiver temperature derived from Friis
formula. Taking into account that GNSS signals are below the thermal
noise floor, the AGC is driven by the ambient noise or interference
rather than the signal power. Consequently, it can be assessed that
interfering signals are a main source that changes the AGC gain level.
However, the presence of the AGC, even if the system seems to be
driven by the thermal noise power, is necessary to calibrate the gain
in order to define a correct received input power and also a possible
RFI. In [11][51][41] the AGC level as an interference assessment tool
has been investigated and the possible application of the AGC as an
RFI detection solution is provided. AGC is sensitive to both wide band
noise and continuous wave interferences. In [51][41][40] it has been
shown that the AGC gain changes differently according to the type
of interferers. Thus, if the incoming jammer is known and the AGC
is previously calibrated against different types of attacks, it can be
possible to estimate interfering power from the AGC level. In a pre-
correlation method using AGC gain and adaptive lattice Infinite Im-
pulse Response (IIR) filter parameters is provided. It can be used for
detecting intentional interferences before the tracking stage. In addi-
tion, authors have carried out a classification method exploiting both
AGC and IIR filter metrics. Therefore, the proposed algorithm is able
to discern which kind of interfering occurs among single tone, swept
signals and band limited white noise. As already said, due to the
fact that the received signal is embedded in noise, the signal samples
distribution is expected to be Gaussian. This is the reason why AGC
component adjusts the gain in order to reach this type of distribution
of the received samples. The more sensitive the AGC algorithm, the
more accurate the detection of the RFI events [41].
In Figure 106 the AGC component is shown within the typical GPS re-
ceiver architecture. The function of the AGC is to optimize the gain of
the front end to that of the analog-to-digital converter.
Figure 106: Typical GPS receiver with AGC shown
In [4] an interesting application of the AGC as a interfering detector
is provided. The author describes the use of the AGC component re-
sponse within the GPS L1 bandwidth as a simple way to detect poten-
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tial spoofing signals. The noise-driven characteristic causes instability
of the AGC output due to the continuous gain variation according to
the received power. Taking into account this, a calibration of the AGC
is necessary in order to define statistical properties in the nominal
conditions, i. e.without spoofing events. The proposed results show
that the presence of the spoofer, after an accurate calibration, adds
energy in the useful band with a consequent drop of the AGC gain
level. However, all the testing results have been carried out in a con-
trolled scenario, neglecting how much jamming events can occur in
real sites. Given that, an AGC-centric approach will not be reliable as
it could arise false alarm flag too often. Consequently, the only AGC
component cannot be considered as a stand-alone detector, but it can
be considered as a complement to other approaches, providing an
effective spoofer detection.
3.4.3 Correlator
In order to deny the correct GNSS acquisition and tracking procedures,
spoofing signal make a fake correlation peaks being able to overlap
the authentic one, leading the target receiver to a wrong tracking
solution. The correlation output could be distorted by a spoofing at-
tack, but the effect of the interaction with the authentic signal can be
mistaken for multipath effects. Thus, some of the mitigation of multi-
path effect have been used to detect spoofing signals [59][19]. Firstly,
the spoofer has to align its counterfeit signal to the authentic one,
and possibly once aligned it has to increase the power in order to
be tracked by the receiver tracking loop. In order to be aligned with
the useful signal, spoofing has to perfectly know the position of the
target receiver and thus estimate correctly necessary parameters. In-
stead, when the spoofer is not able to define in a correct manner the
synchronization with the authentic signals, it the correlation window
a strong correlation peak appear. This additional peak moves towards
the authentic one trying to misdirect the tracking solution.
3.4.4 C/N0 estimation
As for the previous measurements, the carrier-to-noise ratio C/N0
estimation can be used to detect RFI events, but it is a noisy measure-
ments. The environmental effects can strongly affect the C/N0 mea-
surements, but unlike the AGC information the C/N0 measurements
can be easily obtained from the receiver as it is an observable informa-
tion. The C/N0 is a wide used metric in assessment of the quality of
the tracking signals. This value is always evaluated in function of the
elevation angle: greater the elevation angle, the higher the value of
the C/N0, due to the clear visibility of the satellites in orbits. When a
RFI event occurs, consequently there is variation in the estimate C/N0
value. RFI raises the noise floor and thus the C/N0 presents a drop
proportional to the interfering power that jams the target receiver. In
presence of a spoofing signal the effects on the C/N0 estimate are
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similar to the RFI case. The spoofer can increase the noise floor of the
target receiver with the aim to disrupt the acquisition and tracking of
the authentic signals, but conversely to the RFI case the spoofer cre-
ates correlation peaks and thus C/N0 value commensurable to the
authentic one. Thus, the detection is more difficult due to the capa-
bility of the spoofer source to generate counterfeit PRNs with a power
equivalent to the expected one.
3.4.5 AGC & Correlator & C/N0 : A combined Technique
In the previous sections a brief description of the measurements pro-
vided by components inside the GNSS receiver is reported. The proper-
ties of the aforementioned approaches have been described, defining
how them can be implemented as a jamming and spoofing detec-
tion techniques. The drawback is that all the methods proposed as a
self-contained anti-jamming techniques, an thus considered indepen-
dently, cannot be implemented due to their high probability of false
alarm. As a matter of fact, for the AGC if a previous calibration is
not made, the spoofing detection by means of the drops on the AGC
level is not reliable, due to the fact that the components is driven by
noise and thus any type of interference can be classified as a spoofing
signal. The correlation distortion measurement can be lead astray by
multipath components and the C/N0 estimates is highly sensitive to
any type of events that increases the noise floor in the GNSS receiver.
In [80] authors have proposed a non cryptographic GNSS anti-spoofing
technique which exploits the difficulty of a spoofing source to gener-
ate a successful attack with both low PRNs power and minimizing the
distortion in the correlation profile. The described method consists in
monitoring simultaneously the received power and the distortion in
the correlation shape. According to the authors, the combination of
the two techniques permits to discern between multipath and spoof-
ing effect and also to reduce the false-alarm probability with respect
to the stand-alone approach.
Taking into account all these consideration and possible drawbacks
of the aforementioned techniques, we propose a spoofing detection
technique that relies on the combined observation and evaluation of
the measurement carried out by the components of the GNSS receiver,
i. e.AGC gain level, correlation shape and C/N0 envelope. As already
stated, all the measurements are sensitive to the fluctuation due to the
presence of the noise power and taken individually they are not reli-
able in detection spoofing effect. However, if a spoofer attack occurs,
it determines contemporary distortions in all the processing measure-
ment and thus it is possible to define a detection method by observing
how and when these distortions are present. For example, if the AGC
gain level has a very huge drop, the correlation distortion monitor
presents a lack of the expected shape and the C/N0 value is very
low even if the elevation angle is high, this could mean that a high
power jamming event is occurring. Instead, if the AGC gain level has
a fluctuation, the correlation distortion presents a variation without
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any lack of profile, and the C/N0 has a drop (at high elevation angle)
but successively achieve again the expected value, it is very probable
that a spoofing event is occurring. Thus, it can be possible to define a
detection method by exploiting the combined measurements of AGC,
correlation shape and C/N0 estimate.
3.5 numerical results
In order to confer effectiveness to the proposed approach, simulation
results are shown in the following. These are carried out elaborating
collected data both in controlled scenario and airport service area.
3.5.1 Scenario
The first simulation campaign is carried out elaborating data which
have been collected from spoofing scenarios using the NovatelG3 re-
ceiver. From this data, both AGC and SQM messages are extracted in
order to be monitored. Four different spoofer scenarios have been con-
sidered: the first one is the baseline scenario without spoofing signal;
in the second, a spoofing signal with a very high power is consid-
ered (Ds2); in the third (Ds3) and fourth (Ds4) scenarios spoofer with
a matched power with respect to the authentic signal is considered.
The corresponding parameters are listed in table 12.
Scenario Spoofing Platform Power
Type Mobility Adv.(dB)
Baseline No - -
Static Overpowered Time Push (Ds2) Time Static 10
Static Matched-Power Time Push (Ds3) Time Static 1.3
Static Matched-Power Pos. Push (Ds4) Position Static 0.4
Table 12: Spoofing Scenario Parameters
The second simulation campaign is carried out considering signals
collected by airport stations placed in different locations in the world.
These stations are equipped with WAAS receiver antennas. Also in
this case, both AGC and SQM message are extracted to be elaborated.
3.5.2 Simulation Results
In this section simulation results of the previous measurements cam-
paigns are shown. Firstly, we consider the data collected in the con-
trolled spoofed scenarios, described in table 12. Subsequently, results
from WAAS antenna in airport area are analyzed. A parsing code
implemented in MATLAB platform has been used in order to parse
this signal collected by the NovatelG3 receiver.
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3.5.2.1 Spoofed-controlled test
In Figure 107 the AGC gain envelope in the aforementioned four sce-
narios is shown. It is possible to notice that in the baseline case, the
figure in the top left, the envelope of the AGC level it is quite con-
stant, due to the absent of any kind of disturbance. In the Ds2 case,
the figure in the top right, the AGC gain decrease rapidly defining a
huge variation due to the fact that there is a spoofing input power
that bury the authentic signal. In the Ds3, the figure in the lower-left,
the AGC drop is decisively lesser than the previous case, but at the
same time it defines the presence of some extra input power, due to
the presence of a matched-power spoofing signal. In the last Ds4 case,
the figure in the lower right, the AGC gain level is lesser than the pre-
vious case due to the presence of a spoofing signal even in this case
with a matched-power to the authentic one.
Figure 107: AGC gain for the baseline and three spoofed scenarios
In Figure 108 the correlator measurement in the four scenarios is
evaluated in function of the chip offset and time. As for the previous
case, it is possible to notice the effects of the presence of the spoof-
ing signal, in particular for the matched-power cases. In the baseline
case no alteration are visible, as expected due to the absence of the
spoofing signal. Also in the Ds2 case any variation is detected, but
conversely to the previous case, now the correlation shape is uniform
because the victim receiver has tracked the spoofed signal that has a
very high power. Instead, in case Ds3 and Ds4 evident variations in
the correlation profile are present. In Ds3 case the fluctuations occur
for both negative and positive offset chip. The case of variations lo-
cated in negative offsets, i. e.they occur in advance with respect the
0 offset, has an important meaning. They cannot be produced by the
presence of multipath effects because it is always appears later with
respect to the synchronized replica. Thus, the presence of correlation
peak in negative offset represents a spoofing attack that is incoming
in the tracking loop. In the Ds4 case, the correlation shape variation
occurs in the positive offset. In this case, and in general for all the
positive offset peak location, it could be interpreted as the tracking
circuit tracks the spoofed signal and rejects the authentic one.
In order to better define the quality of the tracking operation, dif-
ferent correlation metrics are used. These metrics are defined as a set
of weight-coefficients through which a linear combination with the
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Figure 108: Correlation profile for the baseline and three spoofed scenarios
correlator bins is evaluated. In our approach three metrics are imple-
mented:
• Metric 1: [0,−1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 0,+1,−1,−1,+1, 0,+1];
• Metric 2: [0, 0,−1,−1,−1,−1, 0,+1,+1,+1,+1, 0, 0];
• Metric 3: [−0.0953, 0.3813,−0.5935, 0.3972,−0.8725, 0.9582,
− 0.8680, 0.7322, 0.1232,−0.3189, 0.2056, 0.7654,−0.8118].
The coefficients are 13 as the correlator bins considered. The 7- el-
ement represents the offset 0 and consequently the other coefficients
regard to the previous and to the successive bins, respectively. As
mentioned previously, the linear combination of the correlation shape
is used to evaluate the reliability of the tracking process. In Figure 109,
Figure 110, Figure 111 results of the implementation of metric 1, met-
ric 2 and metric 3 are shown. For all the three sets of coefficients, the
adopted linear combinations define evident variations only for the
spoofing signals with matched-power. In the baseline case no vari-
ation is detected, because no spoofing signal is present. In Ds2 the
result is the same as before, but in this case due to the very high
power of the spoofer, the correlation shape does not have any varia-
tions and consequently there is any alteration on the metric. Instead,
for the matched-power case Ds3 and Ds4 due to the fact that cor-
relation measurement is not uniform, also the metric result shows
evident fluctuations for different received PRNs and consequently the
quality of the tracking operation is not reliable.
From the simulation results, it is possible to deduce that the AGC
works well in presence of strong spoofers detecting a high input
power. In case of matched-power spoofers AGC is not reliable because
huge drops are not present in the gain level envelope. Small drops cas
be associated to a noise fluctuation. On the other hand, the SQM ap-
proach, by exploiting the correlation metric, is effective for matched-
power spoofers because the linear combinations present irregular be-
havior. Conversely, SQM is not reliable in case of strong spoofers due
to the fact that correlation function does not present any distortion,
thus the metric test does not show any irregular event.
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Figure 109: Correlation metric 1 in baseline and three spoofed scenarios
Figure 110: Correlation metric 2 in baseline and three spoofed scenarios
Figure 111: Correlation metric 3 in baseline and three spoofed scenarios
3.5.2.2 Aiport test
In the following, results of the second measurement campaign are re-
ported. The evaluated data has been collected in real scenario, and not
controlled as in the previous case, by a WAAS antennas located in an
airport area. From these data, messages of AGC and C/N0 have been
extracted and evaluated, writing and implementing a parser code in
MATLAB. In particular, among the stations evaluated only two refer-
ence stations are considered, FAI and ZMA-A stations.
In Figure 112 and Figure 113 the AGC gain envelope in time is
shown for FAI and ZMA-A stations, respectively. First of all, the time-
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axis is expressed in seconds from the conversion of the time-stamp
information embedded in the GPS message. The value Time of Week
(TOW) represents the number of the week in which the signal is re-
ceived at which the seconds are added.
It is possible to notice that the in the FAI station AGC level presents
a fluctuation in the range from [612 − 627] around the mean value
620.61. This variation is due to the only noise power showing that any
RFI event or spoofing event occurs in the considered time-window. In-
stead, in the ZMA-A station AGC level is affected by several and deep
drops for the entire considered time-window. These variations show
that several interfering events are present causing also very huge drop
of the AGC gain proving that high powers are injected in the target
receiver.
Figure 112: Automatic Gain Control of a free RFI station
Figure 113: Automatic Gain Control of a RFI station
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In Figure 114 a quality comparison between the two stations is pro-
vided. In this case a better time-information translation is defined,
showing the week period in which the signals have been collected.
Figure 114: AGC: comparison between FAI and ZMA-A stations
In Figure 115 and Figure 116 AGC and histogram of the signal are
showed for both stations. It is worthwhile to notice that the free-RFI
present a distribution characterized by a mean value equal to 620.65
and a standard deviation equal to 3.05; for the interfered station the
mean value is equal to 673.29 and a standard deviation equal to 4.76.
Usually, in order to define statistic parameter necessary for a statisti-
cal study, the reference case is the free-RFI case, due to the fact that
the principal aim is to detect malicious event. According to the shown
results, possible detection threshold can be defined by the statistical
value of the FAI station.
Figure 115: FAI station: AGC gain level and histogram
However, all the considerations above are not sufficient to define a
detection method only by exploiting AGC gain envelope and its sta-
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Figure 116: ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and histogram
tistical characteristics. The AGC stand-alone approach is not reliable
because very sensitive to any noise variations without the capability
of distinguish which kind of disturbance is occurring. For this scope,
the C/N0 measurement is monitored. From the collected data, the
message containing power information is extracted and evaluated. As
previously, measurements from FAI and ZMA-A stations are consid-
ered.
In Figure 117 the AGC level and the C/N0 value for the PRN 14 are
shown for the FAI station. It is possible to notice that both AGC gain
and C/N0 envelope do not present any significant variation, confirm-
ing that any jamming or spoofing event is occurring.
Figure 117: FAI station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN 14
In Figure 118, Figure 119, Figure 120, Figure 121 and Figure 122
the AGC level and the C/N0 value for the PRN 14, PRN 18, PRN 21, PRN
22, PRN 24 are shown for the ZMA-A station, respectively. In all the
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figures the drops in both envelopes occur at the same time-instant. In
particular, the AGC considered drop are longer not more than 10 sec-
onds. Thus, from the figures, it is possible to understand that when
an AGC change occurs a change in the C/N0 estimate value occurs
too. Furthermore the main drops in the C/N0 envelope, those one
that are bigger than 5[dBHz], occur in correspondence to high eleva-
tion angle, i. e.in that range of visibility angle in which the received
power has to be the maximum expected one, as for example the case
of the PRN 18. In addition, after the drop the value of the C/N0 comes
back to the expected value. Taking into account all the previous con-
siderations, this aspect can be exploited to define if a jamming event
is occurring and in particular if a spoofing signal is tricking or not
the target receiver. It is well known that the spoofer has to generate
PRNs with power equal to the authentic one; thus, in this cases possi-
ble spoofing event can be present due to the fact that after the short
time-drop the C/N0 is at the expected value, as if the victim receiver
tracks the counterfeit signal without any awareness of the presence
of the counterfeit signal.
Figure 118: ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN 14
In Figure 123 and Figure 124 the C/N0 envelope on time for the
PRN14 of FAI station and the corresponding SQM Metric 1 are shown,
respectively. It is possible to observe that the C/N0 does not present
any particular variation and this is also shown in the relative met-
ric. The shape of the metric is proportional to the C/N0 estimate:
the higher the C/N0 value, the thinner the metric residual. In Figure
125 and Figure 126 the zoom on one C/N0 repetition and its corre-
sponding metric are reported in order to show better the correlation
between the two measurements.
In Figure 125 and Figure 126 the zoom on the C/N0 for the PRN 14
for the FAI station and the corresponding metric are shown, respec-
tively. It is possible to notice that any huge drop does not occur in the
C/N0 estimate and consequently there is not any fluctuation in the
metric results that is very close to the 0 value.
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Figure 119: ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN 18
Figure 120: ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN 21
In Figure 127 and Figure 128 the zoom on the C/N0 for the PRN
14 for the ZMA-A station and the corresponding metric are shown,
respectively. First of all, it is important to underline that the metric
result is evaluated only for C/N0 greater than 35[dBHz], and thus
the time-start is different. However, this is not a critical aspects for
our considerations. The first lobe on the left it is characterized by
five drops in the interval in which the C/N0 is high and then a lack
of signals, going towards lower C/N0 values. The SQM metric value
presents several fluctuations corresponding to the drops in the C/N0
envelope, and also in the metric result the lack of signal is obviously
detected. The second lobe on the right presents a huge drop always in
the interval in which the C/N0 is high and in the metric residual there
is a fluctuation, as to arise a possible presence of a malicious disturb.
Anyway, taking into account all these considerations, the most impor-
tant aspect to be underlined is that comparing the metric results in
Figure 126 and 128 the metric residual is quite higher in the latter one.
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Figure 121: ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN 22
Figure 122: ZMA-A station: AGC gain level and C/N0 PRN 24
Considering that the receiver antenna are GPS antennas and that the
expected C/N0 is defined by the communication standard, the mean
value of the metric should be equal in both cases, but the interfering
events in the ZMA-A case increase the value of the metric residual,
showing that a malicious attack occurs.
The same considerations can be carried out for the other cases. In
Figure 129 and Figure 130 the PRN 18 for the ZMA-A station is shown.
Also in this case, C/N0 envelope presents drops and the correspond-
ing metric is higher than the free interference case, presenting evident
fluctuations in the thinner interval. The same is for PRN 21 and PRN
22 for the ZMA-A station reported in Figure 131 and Figure 132, in
Figure 133 and Figure 134, respectively.
An interesting case is the one represented in Figure 135 and Fig-
ure 136, showing the PRN 24 measurements for the ZMA-A station.
The C/N0 envelope presents two close lobes for each repetition. The
relative metric presents values similar to the previous case, but the
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Figure 123: FAI station: C/N0 PRN 14 envelope
Figure 124: FAI station: Metric 1 residual for the PRN 14
Figure 125: FAI station: Zoom on C/N0 PRN 14 envelope
most interesting results is the presence of the first metric burst. This
smaller C/N0 estimate cannot be associated to a delayed replica due
to the fact that it occurs in advance respect the bigger one. Thus it
can be associated to the presence of a spoofer or a strange repetition
of the PRN 24.
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Figure 126: FAI station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the PRN 14
Figure 127: ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 14 envelope
Figure 128: ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the PRN 14
Figure 129: ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 18 envelope
In conclusion, these results have shown that a possible combined
technique can be exploited for a jamming detection technique and
above all for a starting point for the spoofing detection, that has to be
further investigated and improved.
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Figure 130: ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the PRN 18
Figure 131: ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 21 envelope
Figure 132: ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the PRN 21
Figure 133: ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 22 envelope
3.6 conclusions
In this chapter an approach for the jamming and spoofing detection
is proposed. The described method consists in the combined evalua-
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Figure 134: ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the PRN 22
Figure 135: ZMA-A station: Zoom C/N0 PRN 24 envelope
Figure 136: ZMA-A station: Zoom Metric 1 residual for the PRN 24
tion of the AGC, correlator profile and C/N0 estimate measurements
intrinsically generated by the GNSS receiver. Simulation results have
substantiated the effectiveness of our approach. Results have been car-
ried out using data collected in different scenarios with different con-
ditions. From the analysis of the spoofed data, it was possible to de-
duce that the AGC approach works well in case of strong spoofers, but
it is not effective with the weak ones. Conversely, the SQM approach
is not reliable for strong spoofer, but it works well for matched-power
cases. In addition, from analysis of the airport data, it is evident that
in real scenario AGC is strongly affected by RFI events, thus aiding
techniques has to be added. Accordingly, AGC, correlation and C/N0
measurement have been shown highlighting which can be the effects
of a spoofing attack, and they have been processed in order to define
the presence or not of the malicious event. However, the combined
evaluation of these metrics improves the possibility of detection of
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counterfeit signals affecting the receiver, decreasing the false alarm
rate that could be higher if a single metric is used as a stand-alone
approach.
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S P O O F I N G D E T E C T I O N T E C H N I Q U E S : F U RT H E R
D E V E L O P M E N T S
The research of efficient and simple spoofing detection and mitiga-
tion techniques will continue to be the main scope in GNSS research
field. Considering all the analysis described in the previous chapter,
GNSS conventional receiver are strongly subjected to jamming and
spoofing attacks. In particular, if the receiver can detect the presence
of a jamming signal because its power is above the useful signal, in
case of spoofing signal the receiver is not consciousness of the occur-
ring attack because the signal power is matched with the authentic
one. Thus, in order to avoid that counterfeit signals trick the target
receiver, efficient detection techniques need to be designed.
In this work it has been show that a possible combined observation
of receiver measurements can be applied as jamming and spoofing
detection technique for a stand-alone GPS receiver, which does not
benefit of any additional measurement provided by aiding systems.
Observing AGC, correlator shape and C/N0 measurements it is pos-
sible to define a detecting method. With particular assumptions, it is
also possible to detect spoofing signals. We expect that the complexity
increases, but all these metric are provided by the GNSS receiver and
thus no any modification in the hardware and software architecture
has to be made. Two different main scenarios have been proposed: the
controlled and the airport one. It has been shown that the combined
solution can be effective in the detection of spoofing signal too, with
a possibility to reduce the receiver vulnerability.
However, it is obvious that update end efficient techniques have to
be designed in order to counteract the increasing and fast diffusion
of spoofing equipments. Spoofing constitutes the main threat for a
navigation system receiver, and research on this matter will continue
to appear and to be a challenge, every time that new scenarios or
more complex systems will be taken into consideration. Thus, further
developments are required. In the real-world scenario GNSS receivers
are subjected to the multipath propagation effects due to the several
reflections generated by the surrounding scenario. Consequently, it is
necessary to take into account also the possible effect that the mul-
tipath propagation can generate. The scope is to efficiently discern
added peaks generated by multipath and peaks generated by the
presence of the spoofing signal. In this direction, it could be possi-
ble to define statistical properties for both multipath and spoofing
and then to develop a countermeasure technique. On the other hand,
a possible approach could be the observation of the correlation shape.
If a peak is located in the negative offset of the AC function, i. e.it is in
advance with respect to the zero-offset, thus this peak can only rep-
resent the presence of a spoofing attack (because a spoofer is able to
move the peak "to the left"). It cannot be confused as a multipath ef-
fect, because in this case the peak has to be located later than the align
127
128 spoofing in gnss
time-instant due to the nature of the multipath propagation. Other so-
lutions are represented by the improvement of the techniques based
on the observation of the C/N0 estimation in function of the elevation
angle and in comparison with contemporary drops in the AGC gain
level (as defined in Chapter 3). In addition, possible solution is repre-
sented by the implementation of spare searching correlators that can
"look for" energy outside the main peak and thus signals that have a
wider bandwidth with respect to the receiver. This technique can be
efficient but with a higher complexity because more correlators are
required. Conversely, the SQM techniques are more probable due to
the fact that measurements are provided by the GNSS receiver.
In conclusion, new challenges are defined by different communi-
cation complex systems. Due to the increasing diffusion of civil in-
frastructure relying on GNSS, these new challenges will need to be
solved trying to not modify the system architecture and preserving
the technical knowledge of the current positioning systems.
C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
In this dissertation, techniques for possible enhancement of the per-
formance in satellite navigation systems have been studied and de-
signed. The common topic between the two presented part is the in-
terfering threat in GNSS.
In the first part the attention has been focused on the study of pos-
sible detection and mitigation techniques for structured interfering
signals. In particular, a jamming detection method performed in the
frequency domain has been provided. The mathematical tool of WT
has been exploited in order to detect discontinuities in interfering PSD
envelope. The same techniques has been applied in time-domain in
order to define the duty-cycle of an interfering waveform. Thus, it is
possible to define the activity in time of the jamming source. Succes-
sively, an improvement of an existing technique has been described.
An analytical study of the chirp signal has been evaluated and ana-
lytical AC function has been expressed in a closed form. Additional
results in terms of cancellation performance have been showed in
order to improve proposed algorithm (in [P4]). Moving from these
results, the aforementioned algorithm has been applied in a differ-
ent and harsh scenario. In this case, the interfering signal has been
considered affected by multipath propagation (UMTS channel), then
resulting from the contribution of the delayed replicas. The described
algorithm has been tested also for this particular case. Numerical re-
sults have shown that the provided method still works properly de-
tecting and canceling multipath jamming signal, also in presence of
the useful GNSS signal. Thus, its effectiveness has been demonstrated
by means of computer simulations and emulations, showing its capa-
bilities.
In the second part of this dissertation, the attention has been fo-
cused on the most sophisticated interfering waveform, the spoofing
signal. Since spoofing signal has become a very important topic, sev-
eral literature works have been presented in order to provide valid
solutions of different kinds. After a deep review of existing works,
a possible solution in spoofing detection has been presented. Our
approach has been based on the jointly observation of different mea-
surement outputs from three main blocks inside the GNSS receiver.
The study has been centered on the analysis of the output signal of
the AGC, the correlator and the estimation of the C/N0. Exploiting
these envelopes in a jointly way, a possible detection approach has
been defined, by the evaluation of data collected in controlled sce-
nario and airport area.
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